CNN national security contributor Samantha Vinograd deserves respect for her service in Iraq and on the National Security Council. That said, Vinograd’s latest assessment of the North Korea situation makes three mistakes.
Speaking to CNN on Sunday, Vinograd began by suggesting that Kim Jong Un is playing President Trump. Trump’s kindness towards Kim, Vinograd says, sends the North Korean leader the message “that he can continue to get away with murder, and with continuing to advance his nuclear program because Trump continues to laud him.”
I really don’t get this line of argument, even if it is a frequently shared one.
Yes, Kim is a bad guy. Yes, the vast majority of North Koreans suffer a totalitarian poverty closer to the dystopia of George Orwell’s 1984 than anywhere else on Earth. Still, I see no feasible way, short of military action, that the United States can achieve North Korea’s ballistic missile disarmament without diplomacy. And while Vinograd is correct that Kim’s nuclear and ballistic missile development continues, Kim also continues to abide by a suspension of long-range ballistic missile tests. That is a manifestly good thing, as is the fact that Kim continues to value his relationship with President Trump. Even if it’s only a small chance that this personal relationship might foster a diplomatic resolution, it’s worth investing in. And yes, even if it helps Kim consolidate his totalitarian power. Trump is right to wish Kim well, as he did recently. As with America’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, our best interests are served by realist rather than idealist appraisals.
Vinograd’s second contention is that “this period taught us that North Korea is really an intelligence black hole. The intelligence community seemingly had a difficult time quickly verifying Kim’s status and his whereabouts.”
Is it true that North Korea is an exceptionally hard intelligence target? Yes. Is it true that North Korea is an intelligence black hole? No. The U.S. intelligence community had confidence as to Kim’s location and situation more than a week before Kim Jong Un finally reappeared. The reason the U.S. did not say so as openly as we might have expected?
Put simply, because Washington doesn’t want Kim to know the extent and success of his monitoring at any one time. To do so might undermine trust between President Trump and Kim, which is the linchpin of the U.S. strategy.
That deals with that.
Vinograd’s final assertion is that we have a big problem in not knowing who will take over North Korea if Kim dies. This is a problem, she suggests, because it precludes America’s ability to prepare for the moment of Kim’s demise.
That’s only sort of true.
While there is no ordained successor to Kim Jong Un, the list of possible ones can be confidently narrowed by considering who retains the levers of power and who retains proximity to Kim. The nature of North Korean politics and Kim’s especially paranoid leadership is such that public standing means a very great deal. As individuals rise and fall in the hierarchy of the party and regime, the U.S. intelligence community can make assessments as to their personalities, psychology, and policy persuasions. This offers some confidence that Kim’s successor wouldn’t catch the U.S. totally blind.
In short, we know more about North Korea than some think we do. And Trump’s decisions should be judged on that basis rather than solely on the basis of his ego.
