He’s adored by some American conservatives for his defense of socially conservative values. But when it comes to Viktor Orban’s foreign policy, the Hungarian prime minister prefers American adversaries.
The most obvious case in point is Orban’s reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Orban preceded the conflict by visiting Moscow in what came across as a misguided pilgrimage to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Orban has now responded to Putin’s war with a policy of overt hesitation. While Hungary has reluctantly agreed to European Union sanctions on Moscow, Orban refuses to allow the transit of arms supplies to Ukraine. Orban also actively resists energy sanctions on Russia. This has earned him common Western ire, including from fellow Visegrad Group members Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. A meeting of the group’s defense ministers in Budapest this week was canceled in protest over Orban’s policy toward Ukraine.
Orban stands largely alone in his quiet support for Putin. Even the normally pro-Kremlin Czech President Milos Zeman, for example, has endorsed a robust response to the invasion. This reflects a common EU understanding, at least at present, that the war requires a fundamental shift in how governments approach Moscow. And it’s not just Russia where Orban prioritizes his favor: Hungary’s pro-China policy is also striking.
Yet it would be a mistake for the West to count Orban out.
Orban’s policies on immigration and issues related to sexual identity find wide support among Hungarians. While some of Orban’s positions are extreme here, others are often casually misrepresented in Western media. The best example of this dynamic comes in the presentation of Orban’s difficult relationship with the EU. Generally disinterested in its own democratic accountability, the EU has waged a pressure campaign against Orban and, in a related sense, Poland, over their domestic policies. (Though it must be said that Poland’s welcome of Ukrainian refugees has earned its government bargaining points with the EU.)
Moreover, notwithstanding his domination of the media and his problematic undermining of state institutions, Orban has a significant democratic mandate. The prime minister’s Fidesz–KDNP alliance won a supermajority in the 2018 parliamentary elections. Approaching this Sunday’s elections, Fidesz stands as a slight favorite facing a unity opposition alliance.
So, although it’s in the U.S. and Western alliance’s interest that Orban loses, it would be a grave error to disregard why Orban finds an enduring base of support. Albeit with an autocratic bent, he has exploited real and legitimate fears over national sovereignty, Christian values, and immigration. The West can reject these policies, but it should not pretend they represent fictions of Orban’s making.
Put simply, Orban might be a friend of American foes, but his power is a product of broader democratic concerns.
