The Iranian regime’s violent suppression of nationwide protests is not merely a humanitarian catastrophe. It is a national security threat Washington can no longer treat as secondary. When a state uses mass violence and information blackouts to preserve itself, it does not become more stable. It becomes more dangerous.
The protests that erupted in late December 2025 began with economic failure. Inflation destroyed purchasing power, unemployment surged, and currency collapse turned ordinary life into a daily emergency. Those pressures exposed a regime that prioritized ideological projects and regional adventurism over competent governance. As protests spread, the government responded with lethal force, mass arrests, and an internet shutdown to isolate citizens and conceal the scale of repression.
This matters for the United States for three concrete reasons.
First, an internal crisis increases external aggression. Regimes under existential threat often try to shift attention outward and rally loyalists through confrontation. Iran maintains a long record of using proxies, missiles, drones, and maritime pressure to manufacture leverage. Leadership that believes it is fighting for survival at home has a greater incentive to test boundaries abroad. That raises risks for American forces, partners, and commercial shipping.
Second, instability in Iran affects economic security. Even under sanctions, Iran remains relevant to energy markets, regional trade, and global risk pricing. Political violence inside a major energy-producing state increases uncertainty and volatility. Markets reprice risk premiums before production collapses, and that volatility affects allies as well as American consumers. Companies operating near Iranian transit points face heightened compliance exposure as evasion networks grow more aggressive under stress.
Third, Tehran’s crackdown sends a global signal. If a regime can impose mass censorship, conduct large-scale repression, and face only modest consequences, other authoritarian actors learn that brutality is manageable. That erodes deterrence across regions and weakens the credibility of Western commitments.
The U.S. should respond with an integrated strategy, not episodic statements.
Start with targeted sanctions focused on the repression apparatus. Designations should prioritize security services, commanders, and judicial officials organizing shootings, mass detentions, and show trials. But designations alone are insufficient. Enforcement must target cash flows sustaining repression, including oil shipping networks and financial intermediaries monetizing sanctions evasion.
The Treasury Department should investigate connections between shipping deception and payment flows, then move swiftly against facilitators. Front companies, brokers, and service providers repeatedly appearing in evasion pathways should face real consequences. Secondary sanctions should apply to repeat offenders, not remain a rhetorical threat.
Next, restore deterrence. Tehran should not assume domestic repression provides cover for external escalation. Defensive postures protecting American forces, partners, and maritime routes must be visible and sustained. Responses to proxy attacks should be timely and have predictable outcomes, so Iranian decision-makers understand that continued aggression carries costs.
Information access constitutes another strategic front. The internet blackout is an operational tool that enables violence by cutting coordination and hiding evidence. Supporting secure communications and connectivity options for Iranians does not require military intervention. It requires political prioritization and partnership with allies and private providers.
The State Department should coordinate with allied governments and technology companies to fund satellite internet access, circumvention tools, and secure messaging. The objective is visibility and documentation. When citizens can communicate and preserve evidence, impunity becomes harder to sustain.
Coordinate with allies. Fragmented sanctions and uneven enforcement give Tehran room to maneuver. A unified approach targeting evasion networks, shipping deception, and financial facilitators produces greater leverage than isolated measures.
Spillover risks deserve attention. Deepening unrest can trigger refugee movements and cross-border instability, particularly in areas with ethnic minorities and contested frontiers. Neighboring states face security burdens, and Iran exploits that pressure through smuggling routes and proxy recruitment. The Revolutionary Guard’s cyber units have incentives to retaliate against external pressure by targeting infrastructure, finance, and communications in third countries.
THE IVY LEAGUE IS MANUFACTURING AMERICA’S ADVERSARIES
A coherent response requires metrics and oversight. The administration should report regularly on whether Iranian oil revenues are actually constrained, whether specific evasion networks have been disrupted, and whether designated individuals have lost access to travel, assets, and commercial services. Congress should tie any future sanctions relief to verifiable changes in behavior, including ending mass censorship, halting show trials, and releasing political prisoners.
Iran is not collapsing in isolation. It connects to markets and security systems that the U.S. has a responsibility to protect. Treating this crackdown as a moral issue alone misses the strategic reality. Washington should act now, before instability becomes a regional war.
Gregg Roman is the executive director of the Middle East Forum.
