BAGHDAD — Look, I think my credentials as an Iran hawk are pretty strong. When, during the Clinton administration, many American policymakers and academics were enthralled with newly-elected President Mohammad Khatami’s rhetoric of “dialogue of civilizations,” I warned that it was a public relations distraction and that the Iranian behaviors that most concerned the United States remained unchanged. My first monograph, Radical Vigilantes in Khatami’s Iran, focused on how hardline, extra-legal forces moved to constrain meaningful reform of the system.
Prior to public revelations about Iran’s covert enrichment program, I called out the Islamic Republic on its secret nuclear, ballistic missile, and biological weapons programs. I advocated for Iranian labor and, while I have consistently opposed military strikes on Iran (because they can never substitute for a more substantive long-term policy), I have not been shy about arguing that the U.S. goal should be regime change. The insincerity of Iranian diplomacy has also been a constant theme and, using Persian sources, I highlighted Iran’s deceitful approach to nuclear negotiations.
My book Dancing with the Devil detailed how Iranian negotiators have, since 1979, run circles around their American and European counterparts. In Congressional testimony and in public writing, I also consistently opposed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as one of the worst nuclear deals ever negotiated.
Oh, did I mention that the National Iranian American Council—Iran’s de facto lobby in Washington—hates me? There’s a reason for that: they know I will neither apologize for Iran nor delegitimize myself by embracing groups like the Mujahedin al-Khalq, whom ordinary Iranians despise.
The point is, I’m not weak on Iran.
So, with that backdrop, let me state: the idea voiced by many of my friends and frequent policy allies that Iraq’s recent moves on Kirkuk and other disputed territories somehow represents a win for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps against the United States is poor analysis for several reasons.
First, it’s not always about us. Iran opposed the Kurdish referendum not because the Kurds are pro-American, but rather because Iran fears the precedent Kurdish independence might have on their own restive Kurds. Those who have embraced the Iraqi Kurdish leaders’ public relations campaign should take care: it’s Middle East 101 to recognize that just because someone feeds you well and whispers sweet nothings into your ear, they’re not automatically your friend. Yes, Sami Abdul Rahman, the Kurdistan Regional Government representative in Washington (and sister to one of the region’s most “controversial” businessmen) tells American congressmen the correct things, but did they ever wonder what her counterpart in Tehran actually says? (Here’s a clue).
Second of all, the Hashd al-Shaabi, the so-called Popular Mobilization Units, are neither universally pro-Iranian nor, for that matter, all Shi’ite. I’m not going to deny that some hashd units are, but not the majority of them. The United States is correct to oppose Qods Force chief Qassem Soleimani for his role in supporting terrorism and murdering Americans, but Soleimani also acts as Iran’s chief diplomat (Iran’s formal foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, is mostly rolled out to handle gullible Western diplomats).
Regardless, the KRG lost control of disputed areas (repeat: disputed areas officially belonging to the Iraqi central government, not Kurdish territory) because Kurdish officials struck a deal to allow it, almost without a shot. The Hashd units have not entered the cities and have largely left the Kurds alone. The same cannot be said back in 2014 when Kurdish peshmerga destroyed Arab villages in zones they sought to annex.
Lastly, and back to the theme that it’s not always about us: This was a win not for Iran, but rather for Iraq. Not every Shi’ite is loyal to Iran and, indeed, most resent Iranian arrogance. Nor is Da`wa—the political party from which Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi emerged—also in Iran’s pocket. There are huge theological differences between Qom and Najaf on one hand, and between factions of Da`wa on the other.
Abadi is neither an American puppet nor an Iranian plant. Rather, he is an Iraqi patriot. He is a nationalist, but one with a vision that embraces multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic tolerance. True, Iran has influence in Baghdad, but so too does the United States when we are present diplomatically and otherwise to wield it.
The Kirkuk operation was precipitated not by Iran or Iraq but by the refusal of de facto Iraqi Kurdish President Masoud Barzani to compromise. He acted unilaterally and turned down a deal, as Bloomberg columnist Eli Lake showed, that would have given him what much of what he wanted through a diplomatic process. Iranian influence, of course, is real, and it is in Washington’s interest to seek to constrain it, if not roll it back. We can’t be naïve.
That said, there is a silver-lining in that recent events give Abadi a boost as the man who defeated the Islamic State and defended the Iraqi constitution in the months before Iraq heads toward elections. This means that not only does Iran not win because of Iraqi moves on Kirkuk, but also that it actually loses — the events of the last week weakened Iran’s real proxies among Iraqi politicians tremendously.
Michael Rubin (@Mrubin1971) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a former Pentagon official.
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