Every nation that could credibly be responsible for this week’s Nord Stream I and Nord Stream II undersea pipeline explosions has denied its involvement. But as Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov told Kommersant newspaper on Thursday, “It is very difficult to imagine that such a terrorist action could take place without the involvement of some state.”
On this very specific point, Peskov is correct. The Baltic Sea waters involved here are shallow. Still, those behind these explosions would have required exact knowledge of where the pipelines were laid, the pipelines’ vulnerability, and the means to deliver explosives to them. This makes it almost certain that a state actor was responsible. The most obvious means of carrying out this attack would be mine-laying, deep-sea divers armed with high explosives. While a submarine, aircraft, drone, or missile could also be employed, they would raise a higher likelihood of detection and the recovery of weapon debris.
Who is responsible?
Most Western governments suspect Russia. A NATO member state would be highly unlikely to risk the trust-based alliance by unilaterally disrupting energy flows and risking an environmental disaster. Poland seeks tougher Western action against Russia but also wants to earn U.S. favor as it confronts unrelated political challenges inside the European Union. Britain has taken a hawkish approach to Ukraine but similarly would not risk its European-U.S. alliances. The Baltic states are heavily reliant on NATO’s protective umbrella and would not risk alienating their allies. Ukraine lacks the technical means to carry out this attack without being detected and would not risk alienating Western allies, without whom it would be lost. Nor would the United States risk an attack that caused a major breach in Western relations. That leaves Russia.
It seems absurd to believe Russia would blow up its own pipelines and associated gas export market. But that is to consider this incident through a Western security prism. Russian intelligence service culture revels in actions with unpredictable risk-benefit assessments and darkly theatrical conduct. Moreover, the pipelines were hardly even operating before the attack. Nord Stream II was completely, if belatedly, suspended by Germany following Russia’s February invasion of Ukraine. Putin recently shut down Nord Stream I so as to blackmail the West into weakening its sanctions regime. Shortly after the explosions, a British submarine-hunting P-8 aircraft flew near the Kattegat North Sea-Baltic Sea boundary. That said, these flights are regularly employed for both training purposes and to search for Russian submarines transiting from the Baltic Sea’s shallow waters to the deeper North Sea waters bounding Norway.
Of note, Russia has called a U.N. Security Council meeting on the explosions for Friday. Moscow is likely to blame the U.S. and/or Ukraine. This, Russia might hope, could degrade the U.S.-European alignment on Ukraine while consolidating domestic support for its escalating showdown with the West. As with Putin’s nuclear threats, this explosion ramps up fear and paranoia in Western minds (an enduring centerpiece of Russia’s covert action strategy).
But we need evidence. How to get it?
First, a maritime investigation of the damaged pipelines. There are two areas of interest: one approximately 31 nautical miles northeast of Denmark’s Bornholm Island and one 13 miles southeast of that island. A British-flagged civilian survey vessel is in the southeastern area, and various European warships/coast guard vessels are operating in both areas. This maritime search will entail physical inspections of the pipelines and attempts to recover samples of any explosives/devices. Though the undersea site and sea currents make this effort far more complicated than it would be on land, successful recovery efforts may help identify who uses the devices involved. Of course, those responsible may have used devices used by another nation to preemptively deflect blame.
Next up, there are various tracking data that will show which vessels were loitering in the area of the explosions in recent days, weeks, and months. Investigators will seek to identify the ownership of these vessels to determine if they are used for covert purposes. In response to escalating Russian threats to Sweden’s Gotland Island and the omnipresent Baltic Sea-bordered Russian exclave of Kaliningrad (an effective fortress outpost), many Western intelligence assets are focused on the Baltic Sea.
The final investigative element will be that of standard intelligence-gathering from spies and signal intelligence. Expect intelligence services to take another look at any intercepts that didn’t make much sense before the explosion. They will also reexamine metadata in relation to indicators of intelligence tradecraft that recently pinged in and around the Baltic Sea.
What evidence of value will be collected is unclear. But whoever was responsible for these incidents will hope the investigation fails to establish a confident attribution of their guilt.
