The U.S. military should do something that sounds crazy: Let civilians apply for some one- or two-star general officer posts, and appoint a board of outside CEOs to select around 40% of the military’s three- and four-star billets.
This is a big ask for a Pentagon used to managing itself without much outside interference. But the boldness is necessary. The simple problem: an unwillingness on the part of Pentagon leaders to embrace new ideas is causing too many talented junior-mid ranking officers to leave the services.
Time and time again I’m met with a variation on the same answer when I ask why otherwise talented individuals left or are leaving the military. I’m fed up. Forced into a never-ending sea of paperwork, politics, and unnecessary training, these officers are simply saying, “Enough.” The tragedy here is that these stupid bureaucratic frictions are resolvable and, if resolved, would encourage many more of the best to stay.
But that’s not what’s happening at present. Instead, those reaching general officer ranks (generals in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and admirals in the Navy) tend to be those who know how to play the game.
That is, the people who know how to knock their academy rings but avoid rocking the boat (literally, in the Navy) and instead focus on sucking up are the people getting promotions. This induces those at the junior mid-ranks of major and lieutenant colonel, and lieutenant commander and commander, to choose the path of least resistance. Rather than privately challenging a commanding officer who gets it wrong or misses an opportunity, these officers find career benefits in staying quiet. A corrosive groupthink is thus allowed to fester. It is totally idiotic that junior and mid-ranking officers currently spend much of their time on tasks that have little or nothing to do with their core roles.
This also allows for a culture which encourages young officers to avoid risk taking. The problem here is that risk taking is a defining quality of the very best officers: it unleashes creative thinking, embraces unconventional solutions, and prioritizes the achievement of the objective. History proves as much: The greatest commanders (whether Patton in France, or Alexander at Gaugamela, or Nelson at Trafalgar, or Napoleon at Austerlitz) are evidence that great victory is won by a commander’s inherent comfort with risk.
That brings us back to my suggestions. The U.S. military should adapt the present commissioning process for chaplains and doctors (involving specialized training and more rapid appointment than for other officer ranks) and invite talented mid-late career professionals from the private sector to apply for one-star and two-star general officer posts. The military would get to pick who makes the cut, but would have to hold a certain number (say 20%) of these billets for private sector applicants.
Obviously these direct appointees would not be positioned to lead combat units or frontline forces. But they could play important roles at various positions on the joint staff, at force management posts, and in logistics and training. The benefit here would be injecting the Pentagon with new thinking.
The 3-4 star appointment board is obviously more controversial. Appointing outsiders to the most senior ranks of the military would cause fury in some quarters. But it would also win favor from junior-mid ranking officers. As America continues its generational struggle with China, injecting talent to command and encouraging lower ranks to be the best must be prioritized. A board of the best CEOs in America (Bill Gates, Tim Cook, Jeff Bezos, Bob Iger) could judge the available two- and three-star officer ranks and vote on who should get one of the limited three-star or four-star billets.
This would keep career military officers at the top while encouraging the most intellectually dynamic officers to take more risks on their way to the top. The CEOs, after all, would be able to reward the risk-takers like never before. In turn, they would cultivate a new power base that allows younger officers to take risks, adapt from the bureaucratic morass, and build a lethal, high-competency fighting force.
Would this effort work?
Yes, if the president and Congress got behind it. But the better question is what we risk if we don’t choose drastic reform. The risk is a military which pushes away the best and brightest in favor of a few good men and women at the top, alongside many politician commanders.
