Since the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad) was revived in November 2017 after a decade of dormancy, analysts have seized upon the Biden administration’s enthusiasm for the U.S.-Australia-India-Japan grouping.
Facing China’s increasing assertiveness, these analysts want the Quad to adopt a more military-focused role in the Indo-Pacific to counter China. That means, for example, moving beyond the Quad’s Malabar joint naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, improving intelligence and logistics sharing, establishing a standing multinational naval force, and even going as far as adopting a NATO-type model of a permanent headquarters with a multinational staff.
Supporting the development of a more military-focused Quad, however, risks undermining the U.S. ability to deter or mount a response toward Chinese aggression in East Asia.
By way of India’s geography, supporting a more military-focused Quad would risk U.S. overstretch. Having to contribute U.S. assets to support a multinational naval force in the Indian Ocean, or even just engage in larger and more regular Malabar exercises in the region, would compel U.S. forces to pay more attention to the Indian Ocean. Expanding the deployment of U.S. naval forces to the Indian Ocean would almost inevitably require diverting elements from the 5th Fleet (based in Bahrain), the 3rd Fleet (based in California), and, most importantly, the 7th fleet (based in Japan).
As assessed by Indo-Pacific Command earlier this year, the U.S. military’s balance of power vis-à-vis China in the Indo-Pacific continues to become “more unfavorable.” China currently commands the world’s largest navy (after tripling in size through a major shipbuilding drive over the last two decades) with a total of 360 ships that are concentrated on its near seas. In contrast, the U.S. Navy is deployed globally with 297 ships. By 2025, China is predicted to field around 400 ships, while the United States may only field 355.
Although fleet size is not the absolute determinant of a country’s sea power (force structure and capabilities are a key factor), diverting U.S. naval forces to the Indian Ocean to support a more military-focused Quad will nonetheless exacerbate this imbalance. Given that the Indo-Pacific is primarily a maritime theater, this diversion would consequently undermine the U.S. ability to deter or respond to Chinese aggression. On China’s periphery, the U.S. has treaty allies (which host U.S. bases and thousands of U.S. troops) and its own territories. Given the U.S. defense priorities in East Asia, a thinner U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean is not a gap that needs filling.
The U.S. could still support growing the Quad’s agenda in the Indo-Pacific without risking overstretch.
At the Quad’s first leadership-level summit hosted by President Joe Biden in March this year, its representatives indicated its potential to serve as a problem-solver in the region in pledging to “reckon with the most urgent of global challenges” by pooling resources toward objectives such as combating COVID-19 and the effects of climate change, bolstering supply-chain resilience, and providing quality infrastructure financing.
The U.S. would be best served by growing the Quad’s activities in terms of providing public goods in the Indo-Pacific. This way, the U.S. can work with the Quad to lead by example in showing that democracies can indeed deliver, without undermining defense priorities in the Indo-Pacific.
Rupert Schulenburg is an MPhil international security studies candidate at the University of St. Andrews with a BA (Hons) in international relations from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
