China is highly unlikely to invade Taiwan before the conclusion of the February 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. China is also highly unlikely to invade Taiwan before it has repaired its challenged relationship with the European Union.
That gives the United States a window of one to two years to boost support significantly for Taiwan. Short visits by congressional delegations, as occurred this week, won’t cut it. Instead, the U.S. needs to adopt a three-pronged strategy to take advantage of this window.
First, and most importantly, Washington must get Taiwan more of what it needs to defend itself. Republican Sens. John Cornyn and Josh Hawley have separate bills calling for billions in defense aid to Taiwan. The U.S. funds would go in tandem with a requirement that Taiwan increase its own defense spending and invest in capabilities that might actually help deter or defeat a Chinese invasion. The double-sided approach to this support is critically important.
Although Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has taken positive steps, the military must boost morale, readiness, and capability. This is especially important in the areas of maritime denial, air defense, and operational redundancy. As things stand, Taiwanese resistance would likely collapse were the People’s Liberation Army to establish a beachhead on the island. The key is to make Taiwan a durable target that would take weeks to defeat — such a potent target that China abandons its consideration of a military operation or faces the real prospect of defeat.
Although China can pummel Taiwan with missiles, the distance between the two nations (81 miles at its shortest point) makes an amphibious assault fraught with risk.
Next, the U.S. should engage with a rising chorus of voices that are more sympathetic to Taiwan. To the chagrin of Germany, a sizable bloc of European parliamentarians are taking steps to strengthen the EU’s relations with Taiwan. Other European governments such as that of Lithuania have come under major Chinese pressure over their support for the island democracy.
The U.S. should leverage the shared values that bind Western powers to conduct more multinational high-level visits, trade agreements, and associated diplomatic endeavors with Taiwan. Beijing is deeply concerned by Taipei’s international partnerships. If it believes that an invasion of Taiwan might lead to an irreparable break in trade and diplomatic relations with the West, it will be less willing to risk that venture.
At the same time, the U.S. should encourage greater Indian engagement with Taiwan and push Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to move military assets to territories closer to Taiwan. Dove though he is, we need only point to Russia’s recent naval adventure with China to give Kishida a wake-up call.
The third prong of this effort should be to frame these developments into a new strategic reality that Xi Jinping cannot undo. The Chinese leader is paranoid about his leadership over the Communist Party and the party’s domestic credibility more generally. For Xi, trying and failing to restore dominion over Taiwan forcibly would be a disaster from which he could never recover. If Xi believes that attacking Taiwan could destroy his broader “Chinese dream” for global political and economic dominion, he will be far less willing to risk it.
Time is not on the U.S.’s or Taiwan’s side. Over the next two years, Washington and Taipei should thus do everything feasible to bolster Taiwan’s ability greatly to deter and defeat invasion.
