One element of Parliament’s newly released report on Russian efforts targeting the United Kingdom is about the role of Moscow’s influence-building and illicit finance on British soil. In two other pieces on the report, I cover the Russian intelligence and British response angles.
When it comes to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s influence efforts, the report references Britain’s recent tradition of tolerating Russian state assassinations and highly aggressive intelligence operations on its soil, and Russia’s use of London as a center for organized crime and money laundering. Britain, it says, “offered ideal mechanisms by which illicit finance could be recycled through what has been referred to as the London ‘laundromat.’ The money was also invested in extending patronage and building influence across a wide sphere of the British establishment — PR firms, charities, political interests, academia and cultural institutions were all willing beneficiaries of Russian money, contributing to a ‘reputation laundering’ process.”
It continues, “Lawyers, accountants, estate agents and PR professionals have played a role, wittingly or unwittingly, in the extension of Russian influence which is often linked to promoting the nefarious interests of the Russian state …”
This is right on the mark. Russian oligarchs are notorious for using their deep pockets and Britain’s absurd defamation laws to intimidate journalists into concealing less auspicious elements of their past. I have personally found this in relation to Alisher Usmanov. A corrupt oligarch close to Putin, Usmanov’s team at the public relations company Finsbury (soon to merge with the Washington, D.C.-based Glover Park Group) demanded I remove a reference to his corruption, even though, that is, the U.S. Senate has basically said the same thing. Fortunately, unlike English defamation law, the First Amendment and related case law are strongly in favor of the freedom of the press.
The challenge here isn’t simply one of money and public relations laundering. It is of Russian organized crime groups linked to the Kremlin. They have taken hold in London and are using it as a base from which to support their activities. Considering Putin’s use of the Kadyrov networks as a cutout for assassinations, this is no small concern for British security.
Nor is this just about criminality. The committee observes how “it is notable that a number of Members of the House of Lords have business interests linked to Russia, or work directly for major Russian companies linked to the Russian state — these relationships should be carefully scrutinized, given the potential for the Russian state to exploit them.”
This, one might credibly suggest, is a very good example of British understatement.
As I reported last October, Russian influence efforts toward the British Parliament fix on intermediary agents who offer lucrative investments in return for political submission. Absent a Foreign Agents Registration Act, an equivalent of which does not exist in Britain, and alongside London’s continuing appetite for Russian funny money, there is little public accountability for these very questionable dealings.
To its credit, the committee has performed a minor service just by at least speaking these truths aloud.
