‘Defend Forward’: What the CIA has done since 1947

In the classical military and intelligence context, the “Defend Forward” principle is the simple understanding that protecting America means that we must take our national security mission abroad.

We must secure alliances, engage our enemies on their turf, and yes, sometimes base U.S. personnel at the tip of the spear in harm’s way. Withdrawing within our borders, pretending our vast oceans protect us from our adversaries, is a recipe for disaster. The world is messier and more complicated than ever. “Turtling up” won’t cut it. We must go forward, lead from the front, preferably with small yet agile groups, so that our enemies remain engaged with us overseas, disrupted against coming to America and harming us in our homes. We are safer sleeping in our beds at night if we project force abroad.

I served for 26 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, a forward-facing organization. In the Directorate of Operations, there are no deployments. We don’t “come home.” We operations officers serve abroad, spotting, assessing, developing, recruiting, and then handling agents. These agents are spies recruited to provide critical information that helps guide U.S. foreign policy and disrupt adversary action. Sometimes, we carry out covert action, activities that are not attributable to the U.S. government but ultimately designed to promote U.S. interests. But make no mistake. Home is abroad for the CIA clandestine service.

History is our guide.

The CIA has been practicing “Defend Forward” since our 1947 inception. There are numerous examples of “Defend Forward” to illustrate its value, both at the CIA and across the U.S. government at large.

Let’s start with CIA expeditionary operations. A decade ago, I led a base that was located directly on the Pakistan-Afghan border. It was a giant middle finger to al Qaeda and the Taliban. We took lumps from 107 mm rocket fire every day. But we were so close to the enemy that we were able to collect front-line tactical intelligence and ultimately locate key high-value targets. And those HVTs met their demise. The enemy was stunned at how brazen we were. We were on the offense, in their territory. It threw them off balance.

Recruitment Operations. At the CIA, I ran a specialized unit that directly engaged our enemies, actually interacting with our most elusive terrorist targets. We took the fight to the enemy in their homes and offices while they were relaxed. We got into their heads. And sometimes, they made mistakes, which led to their demise.

National Security Agency/Cyber Command offensive operations: Leading military cyber officials have been quite transparent that in order for the United States to deter Iranian, Russian, and Chinese cyber operations against American infrastructure, we must go on the offense. We must attack the very entities that are conducting these operations. Reportedly, we are doing just this to some degree, at least. Such action not only harms their capabilities, but also deters their future aggressive actions.

Bolstering our allies: I welcomed the announcement on June 11 that the U.S. would send to Ukraine specific equipment to counter Russia and protect its borders. Such U.S. security assistance included counterartillery radars, counterdrone systems, secure communications gear, and electronic warfare and military medical evacuation equipment. We also will provide training and equipment to improve the operational safety and capacity of Ukrainian Air Force bases. In my view, this is a classic “Defend Forward” activity — bolstering our allies against one of our key adversaries, the Russians. That said, it is disappointing that the Biden administration recently canceled the deployment of a U.S. Navy warship to the Black Sea. The British navy deserves credit for its defending forward on this count.

Preaching the “Defend Forward” concept, we must also include examples of what happens when we adopt the alternative strategy — when we regrettably “took a knee” or “turtled up.” I believe that one must learn from the past to improve and innovate.

Examples include the total U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Why does President Joe Biden not leave a small residual force of 2,500 special operations and intelligence personnel that could both protect the U.S. Embassy as well as ensure that a competent counterterrorism force remains in the country? Such a force is also necessary to provide protection for most intelligence activities. We must remain in Afghanistan to prevent it from again becoming a hub for terrorist groups — a hub that can one day be used to attack America again. Like weeds left unattended, terrorist groups will flourish in ungoverned spaces. It happened in the 1990s in Afghanistan. I fear it will happen again with our withdrawal and a seemingly inevitable total collapse of the Afghan government.

Another failure comes with the military pullout from Syria. Former President Donald Trump’s abrupt and sudden pledge to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to remove U.S. forces was a total and complete abandonment of the Syrian Kurds, an ally who fought heroically on our behalf and, frankly, were integral in defeating the Islamic State. While the pullout was temporarily suspended, Biden appears committed to following through on Trump’s misjudged actions. It will provide space for ISIS to regroup and allow Russia to set the geopolitical realities along the Iraqi-Syrian border. Our Kurdish and Sunni Arab allies will be alone.

Neglecting our alliances. Trump’s constant bashing of our NATO allies, and specifically the threat of withdrawing 30,000 U.S. forces from Germany, was wildly counterproductive and a boon to our adversaries. Russia was thrilled that the alliance weakened. Fortunately, Biden reversed this trend during his recent trip to Europe and committed that the U.S. will restore the partnership that protected Europe for decades. But make no mistake, Europe was shaken, and the aftereffects are felt even today.

The Biden administration is staffed by seasoned national security professionals, like the president himself. I am hoping they embrace the “Defend Forward” concept. As of now, there are mixed signals. The total Afghan withdrawal is a colossal mistake. It is the antithesis of this strategy. Yet, our counter-Russia policy seems to have “Defend Forward” as a guiding principle. It includes offensive cyberactivity. It involves exposing Russian malfeasance globally and helping our allies on the front lines in Europe and Eurasia. Kudos to the administration, and I hope they do more to ensure that Russia is contained. But on Afghanistan, with the stakes so high, why take a knee and go home?

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