According to a Thursday report, Trump plans to decertify the Iran deal on Oct. 15. That would be a strategic error.
It might become necessary within the next year, but President Trump should not decertify the Iran nuclear deal just yet.
First off, that action would give the U.S. a very short diplomatic window with which to reform the deal. Following Trump’s decertification, Congress will spend the next 60 days contemplating new sanctions on Iran. At the same time, however, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson will have to persuade the Europeans to support reforms to the deal. And seeing as the Europeans are happy to keep the deal as is, and that the Russians and Chinese will be loath to assist the U.S. in any fashion, Tillerson’s task won’t be easy.
Now consider a situation in which Tillerson won favor from France, Germany, and the U.K. on strengthening the inspections regime and restrictions on Iranian ballistic missile development (the keys to fixing the deal). But then, the next day, consider that some details of the proposed reforms leaked. Seeing as Israeli intelligence will be all over these negotiations and seeing as Netanyahu has high expectations of what a better deal looks like, a leak is very likely.
Now consider the impact of that leak in Washington. Anti-Iran deal senators may come out against the proposed new restrictions even if they don’t know what those restrictions will actually entail. At that point, Tillerson would be asking the Europeans to take major political risks at the risk of Congress introducing new sanctions regardless.
Remember, the Europeans have huge financial interests in Iran that they won’t jeopardize unless they can be confident Trump and Congress are agreed to the new deal. After all, the Europeans know that the moment negotiations over the deal begin, the Russians and Chinese will pick up the phone to Tehran and say, “We don’t want any changes to the deal so please give us all the existing European business contracts.”
What then? Does the U.S. introduce new sanctions and withdraw from the deal unilaterally? Absent U.S. sanctions on European companies that do business with Iran (an option that would cause major transatlantic tensions and economic risk), American withdrawal wouldn’t affect Iran that significantly. Moreover, we would have blown our chance for a better deal. Trump should not copy the Obama administration’s mistake and assume the Iran deal defines the totality of U.S. relations with the Islamic Republic. Whether in Syria, Iraq, or Lebanon, the U.S. has broader regional interests that would still exist after any U.S. exit from the deal.
Then there’s the question of what the Iranian hardliners, who already oppose the nuclear deal, might do in the 60-day window? Attempting to sabotage renegotiations over the deal, the hardliners might attack U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf or conduct a terrorist attack. The Iranian hardliners are brutal, utterly committed ideologues, but they are also savvy political actors. They will seek to exploit any visible tensions between Tillerson and Congress or the U.S. and its allies.
Trump has a better option. Rather than decertifying the deal now, Trump should work quietly but urgently with the Europeans to forge a consensus on dealing with the deal’s greatest weaknesses. He should make clear that he is willing to roll the decertification dice if necessary, but does not wish to do so. This strategy offers the best potential of getting America and its allies on the same page before pulling the diplomatic trigger, and in turn, deterring Iranian hardliner antics.
So yes, decertification might become necessary at some point. But we should be clear: Once decided on, decertification will set America down an uncertain and dangerous path. Trump should hold it in reserve.
