The British Parliament has released a report on Russian intelligence and influence efforts targeting the United Kingdom. I have just posted two other items on its contents: first, on the challenges involved with Russian intelligence, and second, on Russian influence efforts in London.
Here, I consider the committee’s arguments on how Britain can better respond to hostile Russian state activity.
The committee calls for new legislation comparable to our own the Foreign Agents Registration Act, updated security legislation to enable detection better, co-option, and, where necessary, disruption of malevolent Russian activities on British soil. It correctly notes that any parliamentary act must be robust, or “it is highly probable that the oligarchy will have the financial means to ensure their lawyers — a key group of professional enablers — find ways to circumvent this legislation.”
That biting “key group of professional enablers” comment is well earned.
When it comes to the British intelligence community, the committee laments that its CIA-equivalent service, MI6, and its National Security Agency-equivalent signal intelligence service, GCHQ, resource’s commitments toward Russia only grew in recent years. The domestic security service, MI5 (no United States equivalent) lags even further behind in the resourcing here, though with the excuse of countering a very significant domestic terrorist threat. That said, there is cause for hope.
A redacted line seems to reference increased U.K. intelligence cooperation with the Baltic states. The report also notes that the “GCHQ has focused on not only deploying a broad range of capabilities against Russia, but in joining up with others to use their capabilities in tandem.” Between the lines here are the extensive and often symbiotic lines of effort between GCHQ and the U.S. National Security Agency. The committee makes this more explicit by noting that “in responding to the Russian threat, the U.K.’s long-standing partnership with the U.S. is important. It is clear that this partnership provides valuable capabilities that *** [likely: “are only shared” with Britain], and avoids the duplication of coverage through effective burden-sharing.”
Still, there are opportunities even where the committee only sees difficulties. On Syria, for example, the report notes that “Russia views its intervention in support of the Assad regime as a success, and it is clear that its presence in Syria presents the West with difficulty in supporting peace in the region. Russia’s increased links with Iran, and trade initiatives with a range of countries in the Gulf area, complicate the situation further.”
While this is all true, the U.K. could offset Russian influence-building with the Sunni monarchies by consolidating U.S. support for these admittedly imperfect alliances. Britain could also introduce legislation to increase Russian President Vladimir Putin’s now-escalating difficulties in his Syrian adventure. Such efforts would have significant humanitarian and strategic import.
As a parliamentary report, however, the first priority here is to generate and maintain public attention upon Putin’s threat and associated legislation. The committee has gotten the ball rolling, and, hopefully, Johnson’s government and the Parliament will follow up.
