China scored a half-win this summer with its somewhat successful test of a hypersonic glide vehicle.
First reported by the Financial Times, the test took place in July or August. It involved a hypersonic, vehicle-laden, intercontinental ballistic missile traveling thousands of miles before the vehicle launched. The vehicle then operated successfully but missed its intended target by around 40 kilometers. China denies the test was military-related, instead claiming it focused on civilian space exploration. A foreign ministry spokesman suggested the test was of “great significance for reducing the cost of spacecraft use.”
That’s a lie.
Just as Iran’s civilian satellite program is a cover for its ballistic missile research, China’s space exploration program is often used to conceal hypersonic glide vehicle research. This research has a clear purpose and, as evinced by this test, the prospect of profitable outcome. Namely, China’s near-term employment of weapons that can evade detection and interception by U.S. missile defenses. Russia has developed similar hypersonic weapons systems.
What does this mean for the United States?
The first point is not to panic. The U.S. military has a range of hypersonic vehicle programs in various stages of development. One advanced system was successfully tested last month. Even in the unlikely scenario that China and/or Russia achieved short-term hypersonic supremacy, the U.S. would retain deterrent power.
The stealth-survivability of U.S. nuclear ballistic missile submarines and B-2 stealth bombers, which can carry nuclear weapons, would assure deterrence. Ballistic missiles equipped with reentry vehicle-laden warheads are older technology. Still, China and Russia cannot effectively defend against them.
Moreover, the combat utility of hypersonic weapons remains unclear. Perhaps the rapid speed and evasive atmospheric maneuvers afforded by these weapons will be revolutionary. Perhaps not. A 2020 academic study suggested that hypersonic weapons lack the time-to-target advantages that supporters proclaim. Atmospheric drag/energy loss is also going to restrict the range and warhead size of hypersonic vehicles. Especially where they face saturated defense systems such as those the U.S. may employ.
That said, developments in drones and space-based capabilities will provide new opportunities to employ hypersonic weapons. The greatest threat is that hypersonic vehicles might be used with very short notice or no warning at all.
This requires some forward-thinking. Congress might want to reconsider whether its current missile defense strategy is feasible against saturation strikes involving hypersonic vehicles and traditional ballistic missiles. The Navy might want to reconsider whether it should keep building aircraft carriers, which make 6,000 U.S. citizens sitting ducks while offering limited strike utility. The Air Force might want to reconsider its ground-based element of the nuclear triad. Sitting at identified locations, these weapons are to U.S. security in 2021 what the Maginot Line was to 1940 France.
Attention and flexibility, then, should be the watchwords of the hypersonic era.
