Many U.S. citizens are increasingly concerned over the rising rioting across the nation. That’s understandable. What’s not understandable, however, is to jump to the conclusion that the Army should now be deployed onto the streets.
Two concerns justify paused contemplation here.
First, there’s the narrative challenge that would come with active-duty soldiers in combat uniforms policing civilians. While it is true that any active-duty deployment would likely center around guarding city infrastructure and major shopping areas, rather than confronting rioters directly, there is a significant risk that the soldiers would serve as a magnet for rioters.
The Army, after all, represents the ultimate coercive instrument of the state. Seeing as that coercive power is a central focus point for both the rioters’ and protesters’ anger, there is a risk that Army deployments might unify those groups in at least some situations. Considering the real courage and moral sensibility shown by many protesters who have been rejecting violence and even obstructing rioters, we should endeavor to broaden the distinctions between these two groups, not draw them together.
Equally important is the fact that the Army is not designed for civil policing.
As I calculate, there are five Army Military Police Brigades on active duty in the continental United States. But even if all those soldiers were deployed, it would likely mean less than 10,000 total soldiers available for front-line policing duties. Hardly the kind of force surge needed to blunt nationwide riots and create space for civil policing, which is why the Pentagon’s crisis response plans are centering on the 82nd Airborne, which has been given indications it might be deployed.
Unfortunately, the risks are even greater here.
While the 82nd Airborne is the nation’s primary crisis response division that most ready to deploy into rapid action, it is most certainly not a policing force.
On the contrary, the 82nd Airborne is a light infantry force designed for highly aggressive maneuver warfare. Some might say that this orientation suits the 82nd Airborne in being able to deal with roving rioters. It does not. Because when we’re talking about maneuver warfare here, we’re talking about parachuting behind enemy lines to create freedom of action for other Army units to push toward the parachutists.
At the most basic level, airborne units exist to create space and strongholds for follow-on units. In the event of a Russian invasion of the Baltics or Poland, for example, the 82nd Airborne would jump behind Russian offensive lines and attack Russian air defense denial forces. That means preparing for very aggressive ground combat against significant odds. And without much equipment and support. In turn, that means training young men to be very, very aggressive. Hence why U.S. Army airborne units and the British Army’s Parachute Regiment train their soldiers in brawling or “milling” to foster that aggressive spirit.
Yes, these soldiers are disciplined. But put them up against a larger number of rioters throwing rocks at them, or spitting in their faces, and the risk for escalation is significant.
Which leaves us with the alternative. To reinforce the separation of protesters and rioters, to unify voices in support of the former and condemnation of the latter, to ensure maximal police deployments during the evening and likely hours of protest, and to ensure those police units are mobile and can corral roving rioters. And, where necessary, such as in Minnesota, to provide National Guard units to supplement the police.
But I would suggest pause before sending airborne infantry units into Minneapolis.
