For the past year, those of us in eastern Europe have been hearing a lot about Russian meddling in the U.S. elections. It’s giving me deja vu. In 2012, while serving as president of Georgia, I encountered first-hand Russia’s first attempt to seriously intrude in a foreign country’s elections.
In 2012, the leading opposition was Bidzina Ivanishvili, at the time, the largest single individual shareholder in Russia’s natural gas monopolist giant Gazprom. But Ivanishvili’s party was trailing my party in all the major opinion polls, by a factor of several times.
Then the Russians intervened, doing their best to try to discredit our entire election system and undermine our ability to govern. They pushed the message that whatever the outcome of our elections in Georgia, the results should not be recognized and that our country was not democratic.
To further their effort, the Russians not only unleashed their troll factories against us, but they hired numerous U.S.-based consultants who enjoy authority and respect in Georgia. These sources all joined in unison to recognize that my party, the United National Movement, would win the elections, but that this outcome would reveal the undemocratic nature of Georgia’s election system.
That Ivanishvili’s party actually won the elections came as a big surprise both to our rivals as well as the Russians. Another surprise for the Russians followed when we agreed on a peaceful transition of power, because the Russians wanted to bring chaos and discredit our election system and our fledgling democratic experiment in Georgia.
What the Russians wanted was not so much a particular candidate to emerge victorious, but to undermine the democratic system itself.
Based on our experience in 2012 in Georgia, I do not believe the Russians ever seriously intended to try and influence the actual outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election — In other words, Russia did not want to help Donald Trump win. I know Putin very well, and I am certain that he never expected or planned for Trump to win. His intention was different: to destabilize the situation and project Russian “soft power.”
In Georgia, we were subjected to fake news, provocations, and other tricks which were later used on a larger scale in the United States. In short, meddling in Georgia was a warm-up to the 2016 U.S. election.
Putin’s approach was clear: no matter who wins, sink the entire democratic systems in Georgia or the United States into doubt.
In the case of Georgia, according to my sources, several weeks after our elections, Putin said at a session of Russia’s Security Council that “this was the best special operation conducted by Russia in years.” Of course, he never publicly acknowledged anything of the sort.
In the case of the U.S., however, it is clear to me that Putin enjoys the perception that he could influence the outcome of American elections. Through numerous leaks, and through various ambiguities in how he reacts to the process and outcome of the U.S. elections, Putin has bolstered this perception.
In Putin’s mind, this kind of reputation, that of a meddler in foreign elections, is viewed as a strength for him.
In the U.S., Putin may have overplayed his hand. It is unlikely that anyone, including Trump, wants to hear that Putin played a role in getting them elected. In addition, as we can see, Putin has alienated entire sections of the American political class.
But the whole noise about Putin’s meddling helped him in the region where it matters for him the most – his immediate neighborhood, which he is trying to bring back under Russia’s fold.
More and more leaders in the regions surrounding Russia are turning to Putin as a role model, lowering their focus on the West as their closest partners. They like the fact that — unlike leaders such as myself, who lost power during a peaceful transition of power but were then put in prison or suffered other unpleasant consequences — Putin appears prepared to stay in power indefinitely. Yet, at the same time, most of the world continues to view Putin as the entirely legitimate leader of Russia.
The perception of Putin’s ability to intervene in elections on foreign soil, including his interference in the U.S. elections, renders regional leaders very wary of crossing Putin’s path. Their sense is that if Putin can influence the U.S. elections, then just think of what he can do in countries such as Azerbaijan, Moldova, or Georgia. This is precisely the outcome that Putin wants and strives for: the projection of his power and that of Russia.
Much of this projected power of interference is exaggerated. The resources which were apparently put into play by Russia were, in fact, quite limited overall. It seems implausible that efforts such as fake Facebook accounts could really change the results of U.S. elections. But it is the perception that is important here, and the perception remains that in our part of the world, where Russia sees its vital interests, it remains a very strong and dangerous player.
Finally, it is ironic to me that many of the very people in the U.S. who are making such a fuss over Russian interference in the U.S. elections are the same ones from the Obama administration, who in 2012 told us in Georgia that we were exaggerating our complaints over Russian interference in our elections — that everything was just part of the democratic process, that there was nothing untoward going on in Georgia, and even that we were being paranoid.
They were wrong in 2012 to underestimate Putin’s influence, and wrong now to overestimate it.
Mikheil Saakashvili was president of Georgia from 2004 to 2013. He is also a Ukrainian politician and head of the Movement of New Forces party.
