Let’s suppose that the European Union always acted in its rational self-interest. (I know, I know, but humor me.) How would it respond to Britain’s decision to leave?
The first thing that a logical Eurocrat would note is that the majority for Brexit was slight. It would have taken only one voter in 50 to switch sides for the result to have gone the other way. Our Eurocrat might ruefully reflect that, had he and his colleagues shown a little more flexibility when David Cameron sought better terms, the outcome would have been different.
Of course, the EU did not expect Leave to win, any more than it expected President-elect Trump to win. Every British official in Brussels had assured his continental colleagues that Brexit was unthinkable. The president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, unhelpfully blurted out that Mr. Cameron wanted to use the referendum to “dock Britain permanently in the EU.”
In the circumstances, it’s hardly surprising that the EU was inflexible. Why offer concessions to someone who has made clear that, whatever happens, he won’t walk away?
Now, though, the situation is different. Britain has voted to leave, and the existing arrangement will come to an end. What should a rational Eurocrat want to put in its place?
He’d have several objectives. First, he’d want to ensure the prosperity of the remaining EU. He wouldn’t want Brexit to lead, for example, to a market crisis that might damage the euro. Second, he’d want Europe to be militarily secure. At a time when Trump is reconsidering America’s commitment to NATO, he wouldn’t want Britain, the alliance’s second military power, to turn its back on the continent.
Third, he’d want Britain to make as large a financial contribution as possible — partly to show that you can’t get a better deal from the outside, and partly because the EU is always hungry for cash. Fourth, he’d want unrestricted access to U.K. markets — after all, on the day Britain leaves, it will become the EU’s single largest trading partner.
Finally, he’d want some kind of compromise on free movement, so that EU nationals could continue to study and work in the U.K.
His goal, in short, would be to try to preserve as many of the existing arrangements as possible. So our mathematically logical Eurocrat would offer Britain the sort of deal that, had it been on the table earlier this year, would have swung the referendum result.
Compromise can always be found. Britain could, for example, continue to allow EU nationals to come only if they had a job, and with a temporary moratorium on benefits claims. It could keep the rules on free competition that are at the heart of the EU’s single market while negotiating its own trade deals with other countries — beginning, I hope, with the United States.
It could remain involved with various EU research and educational programs, paying its share, while ceasing to fund big-ticket budget items such as agriculture and foreign aid. It could, in short, negotiate a form of associate membership, based on a common market, not a common government.
Would such a deal be acceptable to British Euroskeptics? Definitely. Before the referendum began, every poll showed that the preferred option was a looser arrangement with the EU. It was the refusal of the other EU leaders to accept such an arrangement that triggered Brexit.
Which brings us to the question that is hovering spectrally over the whole disengagement process. Will the EU in fact act in its own interest? After all, if it always behaved logically, it would have ditched the euro long ago and imposed some restrictions on the free movement of people. In Brussels, the doctrine of deeper integration can be more like a religious dogma than a political creed.
Might the EU be more interested in deterring others from leaving than in maximizing its own prosperity? If so, then it’s not a club, it’s a protection racket. Other countries, far from being browbeaten, would likely conclude that they wanted no part in an organization that was held together by fear. Still, politicians sometimes act irrationally.
Still, I’m optimistic. It’s true that divorces can turn nasty; but in international affairs, unlike in affairs of the heart, present interest tends to trump past grudges. Professional diplomats are more even-tempered than feuding lovers.
There will be bumps in the road but, a few years from now, Britain and the residual EU should have settled down to an amicable and mutually advantageous relationship. Prosperous neighbors make good customers. Deep down, both sides know it.
Dan Hannan is a British Conservative MEP.
