President Trump’s new counterterrorism strategy, as released on Thursday, offers a mix of constructive developments and re-branded, but unoriginal, proposals.
On the positive side, Trump’s strategy abandons the Obama administration’s absurd reluctance to identify the Islamic theological foundations that drive many transnational terrorist groups. And to Trump’s credit, the strategy frames these Islamic considerations in a more nuanced way than the overly-broad “radical Islamic terrorism” narrative the president often applied on the 2016 campaign trail.
The strategy also notes that while certain regionally-focused terrorist groups might not prioritize or actuate attacks on the U.S., their constraint matters to national U.S. interests in that they “maintain networks of sympathizers around the world, and retain ties to ISIS or al-Qa’ida, underscoring their potential threat to United States interests.” These groups’ connections to various fundraising syndicates is of special importance in this regard. The key here is that the lines between al Qaeda and various Pakistani terrorist groups, for example, are far more blurred than commonly assumed. The strategy also deserves praise for its unashamed endorsement of illegal-combatant detention. It is absurd, for example, that the ISIS “Beatles” might now be transferred to civilian judicial custody.
Another tick mark comes with the recognition of evolving threat trends, of ISIS-inspired attackers alongside al Qaeda-directed attacks, and of the need to watch for new threats. The strategy notes the rise of the Nordic Resistance Movement, a group of well-organized and increasingly violent neo-Nazi/Viking-wannabe extremists in Scandinavia. And it clarifies something that too few Americans recognize — that Iran’s revolutionary guard corps has the “capability to target United States interests and possibly the homeland.” This is a rapidly growing threat in the context of broader U.S.-Iranian tensions.
Other parts of the strategy, however, are veiled as new when, in fact, they are quite old. The snazzy lines of effort charts reflect longstanding bipartisan executive strategies for addressing terrorist concerns. And although Trump does deserve credit for aligning the Sunni-Arab monarchies in a more productive counterterrorism effort, like his predecessor, the president continues to tolerate Qatari machinations.
Nor is the strategy’s heavy focus on establishing U.S. deterrence against terrorists terribly helpful. Groups like ISIS and the IRGC are, at least at the strategic level, motivated by their perception of an ordained duty. They will not be deterred unless the U.S. is willing to employ means of force that it cannot morally or politically excuse, such as the preemptive use of nuclear weapons or attacking civilian-dominated areas.
Nevertheless, this strategy is at least an improvement on the deceptive mess that was Barack Obama’s strategy.
