Taking a look at the mostly not quite entirely complete election returns from Florida tonight and comparing them with the vote in the 2008 Florida primary. Romney got 31% in 2008, losing to John McCain who got 36%, and he won (based on preliminary figures) 46% tonight, putting him well ahead of Newt Gingrich’s 32%. In other words, Romney on average ran 15% better in Florida today than he did in 2008.
His gains, however, were concentrated in a few large metropolitan counties with large voting populations. According to these preliminary figures, he ran in 2012 15% ahead of 2008 in only 14 of Florida’s 67 counties.
None of these, perhaps understandably, were in his two strongest areas in 2008: the Jacksonville media market, where he ran behind or only slightly ahead of his 2008 mark, or in southwest Florida (Lee and Collier Counties, the Fort Myers media market), where he improved on 2008 but by less than his statewide average. I have long thought that his 2008 showing in southwest Florida was due to the fact that it is an area with a high number of affluent retirees from the Midwest—from places like his home town of Bloomfield Hills, Michigan. I have long suspected (though I have not looked up the time buy data) that his 2008 showing in metro Jacksonville, where most people are of Southern origin, resulted from his buying more ad time on Jacksonville TV stations than his opponents.
Where did Romney make his biggest gains from 2008? In three major clusters. One was around Orlando, in Orlando’s Orange County and somewhat more upscale and adjacent Seminole County and in Sumter County, which includes part of the huge Villages retirement complex. The second was around Tampa Bay: in Tampa’s Hillsborough County, St. Petersburg’s Pinellas County and in Manatee and Sarasota Counties just to the south. The third was along the Gold Coast, from Monroe County (the Keys) through Miami-Dade County, Broward County (Fort Lauderdale), Palm Beach County, Martin County (Stuart: very upscale), St. Lucie County (more heavily Jewish condos) and Indian River County (Vero Beach: Midwestern and Southern retirees). Romney’s biggest gain over 2008 was in Miami-Dade County, where 72% of registered Republicans are Hispanic, mostly Cuban-American: McCain beat him here 49%-16% (with 26% for Rudy Giuliani) and he beat Newt Gingrich here 61%-26%. Romney’s endorsements from House members Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Mario Diaz-Balart obviously played a role, as did the benign interventions in his behalf by Senator Marco Rubio. (See this blogpost for more on this.) Romney’s second biggest gain was in Broward County just to the north, where there has been a big increase in Cuban-American population in the last several years. And perhaps he had greater appeal among Jewish voters in Broward and Palm Beach Counties, although the exit poll says they were only 1% of the Republican turnout.
Romney actually an behind or only even with his 2008 percentages in 10 North Florida counties. But remember that in 2008 he ran as a candidate more conservative than McCain or Giuliani, while in 2012 he was portrayed as the candidate less conservative than Newt Gingrich or Rick Santorum. And Romney did run ahead of his 2008 percentages, though by less than his statewide averages, in the western panhandle (dubbed the Redneck Riviera by many) from Panama City to Pensacola.
Any implications here for the general election? The 14 counties where Romney ran farther ahead of his 2008 showing than the statewide average cast 49% of the total votes in the 2008 Republican presidential primary. These are also counties where Republicans lost House district races, or came close to losing them, in 2006 and 2008. Romney’s gains in these mostly heavily populated metropolitan counties suggests that he has an appeal to voters among whom Republicans have been doing poorly since the middle 1990s—relatively affluent people in very large metropolitan areas. They suggest that he is a stronger general election candidate in such areas than Bob Dole in 1996, George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004 and John McCain in 2008. It has been speculated, and it is plausible, that Romney would be a less than optimal Republican candidate among relatively downscale whites. It has not been speculated, though these numbers make it seem a little more plausible, that he would be a more optimal Republican candidate than the party’s last several nominees, among relatively upscale whites and perhaps among Hispanics as well. Anyway, a thought to consider.
