If the agreement that earned the House speakership for Rep. Kevin McCarthy includes a hard cut from all discretionary federal spending including
defense
, then basic arithmetic says it is dangerously reckless.
By accounts too numerous to be doubted, the agreement includes a pledge for fiscal 2024 (and perhaps beyond?) to cap discretionary spending — everything but “entitlements” such as Social Security and Medicare — at the levels they were in fiscal 2022. A close look shows this is sheer folly.
Granted, for domestic discretionary spending, the goal is reasonably achievable because all it means is a small cut from the pre-COVID discretionary baseline, which itself already was bloated by big increases over and above inflation adjustments under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and especially Donald Trump. (I’ll spare you the exact domestic numbers, which are complicated but not immediately relevant to defense spending discussed here.) But for defense, a return in fiscal 2022 spending would amount to a massive cut of nearly 9% from 2023 levels, not even including the effects of inflation that would make the effect of the cuts significantly exceed 10%.
Contrary to the domestic spending levels, which already were historically distended, defense spending, even after a big boost in 2023, still lagged behind historical practice. In other words, the huge cuts would come not from bloat but from a military that already is underfunded, even as the challenges to national security grow more pressing.
First, let’s understand the arithmetic. When choosing a baseline year against which to measure, it’s not fair to cherry-pick a year in which anomalies skew the picture in favor of one’s own side of the argument. If I were to assert, for example, that “normal” defense spending occurred during the years of the U.S. “surge” in Iraq, it would make a case for much higher outlays, but the case wouldn’t be an honest one. Instead, consider the defense spending approved in 2012 by Obama, hardly a strong military supporter, after the U.S. drew down most troops from Iraq. The $670 billion spent then, adjusted for inflation, would be
the equivalent
of $880 billion now.
Instead, the fiscal 2023 defense discretionary budget stands below that, at $858 billion, not keeping pace even with Obama’s (after accounting for inflation). And a return to 2022 levels (about $783 billion) in 2024 would require a new cut of nearly $75 billion, and effectively a reduction of more than $80 billion once expected 2023 inflation is factored in. This doesn’t even take into account the huge costs of necessary investments in new equipment as technological advances in weapons systems make old equipment obsolete.
Additionally, consider what our armed services face now compared to 2012. China’s total military spending is at least a third larger now, even after taking inflation into account, and China has massively improved both the scale and accuracy of its anti-U.S. capabilities and added hundreds of ballistic missiles it did not possess back then.
Also, the terrorist group the Islamic State, which barely existed in 2012, is now reportedly
reconstituting
for a major attempt at an expected comeback this year. And all around the globe, instability is greater now than in 2012. Iran is closer to nuclear weapons capabilities than ever, North Korea keeps improving the deliverability of its nuclear forces, and Turkey continues moving in an Islamist direction, away from the West.
For all these reasons, it would be foolhardy, indeed irresponsible, for House Republicans to demand defense cuts back to 2022 levels. Weakness invites foreign aggression. The results could be disastrous.
