As Israel escalates its military operations against the Lebanese Hezbollah, the United States should clarify that it would have to wage a war with Hezbollah without U.S. military participation.
Israel’s intent is to degrade Hezbollah forces proximate to Israel’s northern border and therefore allow tens of thousands of Israelis to return to their homes in the north. To increase pressure on Hezbollah, the Israel Defense Forces are targeting command and control nodes and specific commanders in its organization. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government evidently assesses that Hezbollah wants to avoid a broader war, so it will tolerate Israeli action without employing its vast missile arsenal.
Israel has the moral and political right to carry out this action. The question: whether, if full-scale war between Hezbollah and Israel breaks out, it is in the U.S. interest to join that war with direct military force beyond air defense support. The U.S. certainly has forces in the region that it could deploy to such a fight.
Bolstered Air Force fighter and bomber squadrons are operating in the Middle East. The Eisenhower carrier strike group is in the Red Sea and is still only three months into its deployment (standard carrier deployments are six months in duration). The USS Bataan-led Amphibious Ready Group remains off the Lebanese coast six months into its deployment (standard deployment length of 6-8 months). That force centers on the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, a ground combat centered unit.
The question is whether it would be in the U.S.’s interest to deploy these forces against Hezbollah in any escalated war. I do not believe it would be.
There is a key difference between the situation now and when these U.S. forces were first deployed following Hamas’s Oct. 7 atrocities. Immediately after Oct. 7, there was a legitimate fear of Israel being overwhelmed by a multifront war. The U.S. wanted to deter Iran and Hezbollah from seeking to take advantage of the IDF’s distraction with operations against Hamas.
That concern is now greatly diminished. The IDF has destroyed much of Hamas’s combat power and has clearly assumed the strategic initiative in Gaza. And while Netanyahu has interests in escalating against Hezbollah in order to consolidate his weak political position, the IDF’s success in Gaza gives him increasing means to confront Hezbollah better. There is also growing pressure from the Israeli right on Netanyahu to expand action against the Lebanese terrorist group and political party.
Again, however, it would not be in America’s interest to enjoin its forces against Hezbollah.
Were the Marines to enter Lebanon, they would face fierce ground combat action. They would pummel Hezbollah but would also take casualties. U.S. military action would almost certainly necessitate the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. More importantly, it would precipitate major diplomatic damage to U.S. relations with Jordan and the Sunni Arab kingdoms. As much as they loathe Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsor/theological guide, these governments fear regional escalation.
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Most important of all, U.S. military operations against Hezbollah would represent an otherwise avoidable distraction of uncertain duration. They would diminish the means of addressing America’s U.S. strategic concern: reserving forces for a prospective conflict against China. Whether in terms of Taiwan or the Philippines, the U.S.-China conflict threat is far greater than commonly recognized. Due to the weak U.S. munitions base, any air or naval military action against Hezbollah would diminish finite stocks of armaments that might tip the balance between victory or defeat against China.
Put simply, it is Israel’s prerogative to risk war with Hezbollah. But the U.S. should not be a direct party to that conflict if it arrives.
