At a Paris summit this week, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that 26 countries had agreed to provide postwar “security guarantees” for Ukraine as a part of any postwar deal between that country and Russia. Macron spoke of an international force ready to act “by land, sea, and air.” But he also noted that some states would not send troops but instead provide training or equipment.
Thus, unanswered questions pile up: Who would actually send troops to Ukraine? How many? Under which flag? Where would they be stationed: on the front lines, just behind the front lines, in Kyiv, or in the relative safety of western Ukraine?
European leaders have not made it clear how far they are willing or able to go. Italy has already ruled out deploying combat troops. Germany has expressed growing skepticism about a deployment of its own forces. Others, such as France and the United Kingdom, say they are ready to go. The problem is that they may lack the force scale to match their deployment rhetoric.
The result is that what began as talk of large-scale commitments for Ukraine has now shrunk to proposals for a relatively small deployment. For Ukraine, the question of what shape the guarantees will take is critical, given its long history with failed assurances. That experience makes Kyiv skeptical of vague promises.
“After seeing Estonia’s pledge to send 100 personnel, I have no illusions about the size of this ‘force’, a senior Ukrainian official noted with irony on the condition of anonymity. “At best, a small detachment might reach Kyiv; most would remain in western Ukraine”, he added.
Analyses suggest Europe could realistically field a small contingent of around 10,000 troops. Such a deployment would be more about showing political support than providing real protection, opening it to Russia’s manipulations. A medium-sized force of 25,000 would depend heavily on the United States for logistics support in its opening years. This would include airlifts, refueling, intelligence, and the command-and-control systems that bring operations together.
Regardless, Russia has already dismissed the idea of any foreign “reassurance force.” Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that any troops on Ukrainian soil would be legitimate targets. Beyond outright threats, Moscow is also expected to look for ways to shape the outcome to its advantage. Moscow is also likely to push for any security mission to fall under a United Nations mandate, where its Security Council veto would give it leverage to weaken any operation. Any ironclad arrangement that offers Ukraine genuine long-term security would be unacceptable for the Kremlin. After all, the logic that drove this invasion was, in part, centered on preventing precisely such an outcome.
The uncertainty in Western promises works to Moscow’s advantage. To make up for it, European leaders point to “tripwire” assurances with the U.S. backing: If a small force were attacked, America could step in. But a small, lightly defended unit might be the first thing Russia tests. If probed, it may come to Ukraine to defend the very force meant to protect it.
It was under President Ronald Reagan that, in 1983, in Beirut, suicide bombers struck the U.S. Marine barracks, killing 241 Americans and prompting a withdrawal the following year. In 1993, Bosnia offered a similar warning when lightly armed U.N. peacekeepers proved powerless to stop Serb forces, forcing NATO to intervene with air power at far greater cost. In contrast, places where the U.S. has put substantial forces on the ground: in Germany, in Japan, or in South Korea, it has not been substantially challenged.
EX-BIDEN OFFICIALS SIT FOR SENATE INTERVIEWS ON APPARENT MENTAL DECLINE
The Trump administration has ruled out sending ground troops to Ukraine, promising air power and intelligence support instead.
What level of involvement the White House is prepared to commit remains unclear. Yet, whatever form the guarantees take, their credibility will ultimately rest on Washington. Without American forces behind the European servicemen, security guarantees risk turning into insecurities.
