“Generals,” French Prime Minister George Clemenceau allegedly said during World War I, “are always fighting the last war.” A century later, his warning should again be heeded.
2026 will mark four years since Russia invaded Ukraine, remaking the map of Europe and, in many respects, war itself. Taiwan, under threat from China, would be wise to look carefully at what it can and cannot learn from the conflict.
In some ways, the war in Ukraine resembles World War I. The latter was infamous for its static front lines, trench warfare, and the use of new battlefield weapons, from airplanes to mustard gas to advancements in artillery and small arms. It took time for many of the powers to adapt their 19th-century tactics to the new, and more monstrous, terrain of the 20th.
At war’s end, both winners and losers sought to imbibe its lessons. Some, notably France with its Maginot Line fortifications, learned all of the wrong ones. Many expected the next war to also be primarily static. Others recognized that new technologies would allow for wars of maneuver and offense. Militarily, World War II bore scant resemblance to its predecessor. Those who clung to old tactics and outdated technologies paid a heavy price.
The war in Ukraine has been marked by constant evolution. In a recent report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mick Ryan, a retired major general in the Australian army, offered some takeaways from the conflict. One inescapable conclusion: Warfare by drone and other unmanned aerial vehicles is here, and it is here to stay. Both sides have attempted to adapt, with varying levels of success. Yet, as Ryan observes, “Ukraine is not a drone war, it is a war where drones have gained prominence. … Drones do not replace human capacity — they extend it.” Drones are not replacing soldiers on the ground, nor are they a substitute for war’s other basic commodities: artillery, tanks, logisticians, infantry, and engineers.
Long-range strike operations and advanced targeting are also hallmarks. Still, future success will depend on investments in training and technology and, most importantly, adaptive leadership. More than any single thing, rapid adaptation has been the cornerstone of the war. But some factors, such as Russia’s significant manpower advantage, can’t be easily overcome.
Taiwan will face many of the same challenges. China has significant advantages industrially, militarily, and economically. To be sure, an amphibious invasion is not easy to pull off. And a blockade would be risky. But as the “factory of the world,” Beijing will be much harder than Moscow to isolate economically and diplomatically. China will have leverage over Taiwan’s allies that Russia simply does not possess. Ukraine has also benefited from lines of resupply that Taiwan cannot call upon. Should China invade Taiwan, resupplying the island will be extremely difficult.
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In all likelihood, Taiwan will have to utilize what it has at the war’s onset. Taiwan’s best bet is to focus on asymmetrical warfare, turning the island into a “porcupine,” and making an invasion costly enough to shore up deterrence. Some lessons, such as small-unit tactics and UAVs, will be useful. Others, such as long-range targeting, probably less so.
But there is one constant in war: Technology changes. People do not.
The writer is a Washington-based foreign affairs analyst. His views are his own.
