Questions of sovereignty, not neutrality, drive Russia’s war on Ukraine

An old argument has returned to debates over the war in Ukraine: that Russia might not have invaded had Ukraine pledged to stay out of NATO. Amanda Sloat, a senior official on President Joe Biden’s National Security Council, suggested this week that Ukrainian neutrality could have spared lives.

She’s wrong. Russia would have invaded Ukraine regardless of its desire to join NATO.

Ukraine’s recent history supports that point. After NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit, European allies blocked a clear path to Ukrainian and Georgian membership while offering a vague promise of future accession. That ambiguity allowed Moscow to move forward. Later that year, Russia went to war with Georgia.

Kyiv then adopted what critics are now demanding of it: neutrality. Under pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine passed a law ruling out NATO membership and extending Russia’s military base rights in Crimea. Of course, these concessions did not give Ukraine security. When Ukraine pursued an association and trade agreement with the European Union, Moscow pressured Yanukovych to abandon it. After Yanukovych’s ouster, Russia annexed Crimea and launched a war in eastern Ukraine. That was not about NATO; it was about Moscow’s ability to shape Ukrainian politics.

President Volodymyr Zelensky, too, was initially perceived as Moscow-friendly when he came to power, having campaigned on reducing tensions and reviving negotiations. And when, in the first weeks of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine again signaled flexibility on NATO during talks in Belarus and later in Turkey, Russia still refused to stop the bloodletting. The sides simply remained too far apart on the core issues of territory and security guarantees. Russia sought constraints that would have left Ukraine militarily and politically vulnerable. Ukraine sought guarantees that could deter another attack. That divide persists to this day.

Despite heavy losses and a grinding war of attrition, Ukraine today controls more territory than it did in the early months of the invasion. Russian forces were pushed back from much of the Kharkiv region and the city of Kherson on the west bank of the Dnipro. While Russia continues to occupy large parts of eastern and southern Ukraine, the front lines are narrower than at the peak of Moscow’s advance, putting Ukraine in a better position than it was at the onset of Russia’s war.

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Still, the neutrality argument persists. It downplays the continuity of Russia’s demands. Those demands are unlikely to change as President Donald Trump presses for a peace agreement. The discussion at the table now resembles what was discussed in 2022: possible territorial concessions, limitations on Ukraine’s armed forces, and security guarantees. The problem?

Russia is ultimately seeking control over Ukraine’s sovereignty.

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