Why neither Trump nor Iran wants a return to war

Published June 2, 2026 1:05pm ET



The U.S. military and Iranian forces continue to launch attacks on one another. So, why does the ceasefire broadly still hold?

The answer is actually quite simple. The ceasefire is holding because President Donald Trump and Iran individually believe that they, more than the other, can maximize their interests by matching tit-for-tat violence with diplomatic patience. Both sides also believe that a resumed war carries far more risks than it offers possible benefits.

Trump is gambling that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps hard-liners who now hold most decision-making sway will buckle under the economic pressure of the U.S. Navy blockade of Iranian oil tankers. And, in turn, that they will accept a peace agreement that sees Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz energy export chokepoint, suspend nuclear activities, and surrender enriched nuclear material.

In contrast, Iran hopes that the U.S. domestic pressures born of the Strait of Hormuz closure will see Trump accept a ceasefire predisposed toward Tehran. Iran knows that U.S. gas prices are causing growing Republican concern amid the approaching midterm elections. Iran thinks that the longer it holds onto the strait, the likelier it becomes that an agreement requiring only limited Iranian sacrifices on its nuclear program and significant up-front sanctions relief.

Ultimately, the gaps between what the United States and Iran each want from a deal will be bridged either by compromises or by a return to war. But the basic point is that neither side believes that a return to war would be a good option

Its incessant bluster notwithstanding, even the Revolutionary Guard knows that while a resumed war would increase political pressure on Trump, it cannot defeat him. At the same time, the regime has already suffered very significant damage but not yet existential damage. Alongside the U.S. blockade that has cut off its revenue stream, however, Iran knows that more war would see it suffer even worse damage. The regime’s greatest fear is that the more damage it suffers, the more likely an uprising by some of Iran’s 93 million-strong population.

On the U.S. side, the anti-war calculation centers on what a resumed war would feasibly accomplish.

Some conservative commentators, such as Marc Thiessen and Mark Levin, argue that U.S. interests are best served by resuming the war. As Thiessen put it last week, “A deal — even a good one — would let [Iran] off the mat, giving it a financial lifeline, and a pathway to ultimately reconstitute what Trump has destroyed. … Trump would be better off destroying Iran’s remaining military capabilities, opening the Strait of Hormuz by force, keeping the U.S. blockade in place to strangle the remnants of the regime economically, and then directing the CIA to launch a covert operation to arm and train the Iranian opposition so it can liberate its country.”

If only it were so easy. Via virtue of Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, Trump now knows that actually accomplishing these tasks is far, far harder done than said. Forcibly reopening the Strait of Hormuz and effecting near total destruction of Iran’s missile, drone, and military power would take months. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it on Tuesday, Iran still has a lot of drones remaining.

Crucially, also, winning the Hormuz battle would absolutely require U.S. ground action on the southern Iranian coast and its islands of Qeshm and Kharg. That would mean dozens, if not hundreds, of U.S. casualties. There is little political appetite for these military options per se, but especially in that they would accomplish little more than what a peace deal could otherwise accomplish now. Which is to say, a temporary destruction of Iran’s combat power but not the regime itself.

In the same vein, the U.S. blockade of Iranian oil is a strategic masterstroke but not a magic bullet. It would take years to bring down the regime without other supporting efforts. Which brings us to Thiessen’s call for CIA covert action to overthrow the Iranian regime.

While possible, this action would be fraught with extreme risk and unpredictability. It would probably take years to succeed and, as with CIA covert action against Bashar Assad, would be far from guaranteed to succeed. It would also require U.S. ground troop deployments numbering in the thousands. And it would risk a terrible humanitarian and refugee crisis alongside last-stand mentality regime terrorism and nuclear weaponization. Clean regime change and the transition to an alternate government would be in America’s interest. The far likelier bloody civil war would not be.

In short, Trump appears to have recognized that while sustained war is in Israel’s interest, being in that it would eliminate Israel’s preeminent nemesis, it is not in the U.S. interest. Hence, why tensions between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are growing.

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The ceasefire is likely to lead to a deal that makes hard-liners on both sides unhappy. And perhaps one side will give up far more than the other. But the basic truth is that neither side sees a return to war as a good option.

Hence, we have what we have now: an unconventional and sometimes bloody ceasefire guarded both by diplomatic hopes and by fears of what might follow in its absence.