One day before the arrest of four Georgia men allegedly trying to manufacuture a biological weapon to use against the United States, the Government Accounability Office (GAO) made recommendations for a “national biosurveillance strategy” that incorporates non-federal resources, warning that “the nation is at risk for a catastrophic biological event.”
Given that “early detection of potentially serious disease indications nearly always occurs first at the local level,” the GAO report indicated that ignorance by the federal government about state and local abilities to respond to bio-terror threats exacerbated a national security issue.
“Until it conducts an assessment of nonfederal biosurveillance capabilities,” wrote William Jenkins, GAO director for Homeland Security and Justice, “the federal government will continue to lack key information about the baseline status, strengths, weaknesses, and gaps across the biosurveillance enterprise to guide development and maintenance of a national biosurveillance capability.”
GAO published Jenkins’ report two days ago. Yesterday, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested four alleged members of a “fringe militia group” in Georgia for planning “to manufacture the biological toxin ricin for use in attacks against other U.S. citizens and government personnel and officials.” The FBI monitored the plans with the aid of a “confidential source” with whom the men discussed their plans, which included assassination of government officials.
The men “acknowledged that these actions would constitute murder,” according to the FBI, “but reasoned that the actions were necessary in accordance with their ideology.”
In the GAO report, Jenkins acknowledged that “the federal government has undertaken numerous efforts to support early detection” of biological terror threats, but cautioned that “these efforts are not well integrated” with each other.
Jenkins suggested that the National Security Agency has not provided “a clear mission and vision for the desired end state of a national biosurveillance capability,” which hampers the development of biosurveillance capability.
According to the GAO, the Department of Homeland Security “concurred” with the report’s findings in written comments. GAO added that “the National Security Staff acknowledged the accuracy of the information contained in the report but did not comment on the recommendation.”
