Commentators offer the common refrain that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s escalating aggression takes root at the intersection of Putin’s insecurity and his pride. Their argument is that Putin is threatening war with Ukraine and demanding compromises from the United States and NATO in order to gain attention and present Russia as a great power.
But this assessment misreads Putin. The Russian president is not doing what he’s doing because he wants attention. Putin is doing what he’s doing in order to extract tangible concessions. And were Russia not a great power, there would be far less worry about what Putin might do next or how to deal with him.
Judged by the ultimate definition of state power, the means to achieve a desired effect, Russia is a great power.
Russia’s economy might be smaller than those of Canada and Italy and only slightly larger than that of the relatively tiny country of Australia. Still, Putin has levers of power that allow him to punch far beyond his economic limitations.
On the military front, Russia retains robust nuclear strike forces. Russia has the most nuclear warheads of any nation, approximately 6,200 in total. In 2022, the Russian navy will have 12 deployable ballistic missile submarines, including five of its most advanced Borei-class (the U.S. Navy operates 14 ballistic missile submarines). New Russian strategic weapons rival and in some cases exceed deployed U.S. capabilities. Russia’s electronic warfare and space-based military capabilities are equally advanced. Russia’s attack submarine forces, missile and artillery forces, and mechanized infantry units are also capable and generally well-equipped (though munition stocks and morale are lacking). This is political power at its apex: the means to leverage political concessions via credible threat of destruction.
Russia affords itself outsize geopolitical influence in other domains.
Putin has co-opted a wide range of influential politicians and business interests in Europe. Partly enabled by the Biden administration, Russia has also established a stranglehold over the European energy market. As we’re seeing at this very moment, this allows Putin to manipulate price points and extort political concessions in return for energy supplies. Especially during the cold European winter.
Empowered by the failure of Western governments to restrain and deter them, the Russian intelligence services embrace a culture of aggression alongside an extremely high tolerance for risk. Assassinations are common and not always reported as such. So, too, do the Russian intelligence services, especially the SVR Foreign Intelligence Service, take advantage of a Western perception that their officers are universally shoddy.
Underpinning all these efforts is the deliberate cultivation of fear that Russia might be capable of anything and so it’s better just to do what Putin wants. Whether Russian jets are bombing hospitals in Syria, or the FSB Federal Security Service is deploying ransomware gangs inside U.S. networks, or the GRU is running wild with mercenaries in Africa, Putin has educated the world to his ruthless disregard for international norms.
This carries political effect. Egypt, Israel, Iran, and the Sunni Arab monarchies all have good relations with Russia. Each seeks Russian support not because they like Putin but because they don’t want to lose influence with him. In Saudi Arabia’s case, in particular, states are willing to pay big bucks for this privilege. Even amid major tensions with China, India continues to prioritize Russian arms exports and international cooperation. On that point, and although still tentative, Russian links with China strengthen Putin’s ability to challenge the U.S. and its Pacific allies.
The takeaway from all this is that Putin’s aggression won’t be corralled by treating him as some kind of petulant pretender. As evinced by its global practice, Putin’s power is real and exerted to effect. Facing the negative extensions of this power and the inherently anti-American ideological impetus that guides them, Putin can thus only be corralled by the application of greater resolve and power against him.
