Almost 300 pages of emails released by Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder dealing with a city with lead in its drinking water paint a picture of an administration skeptical of an issue until a sudden change in October.
The emails shed some light on what was happening inside state government as the scandal picked up steam in late summer and became a full-blown emergency in the fall.
The emails show that Snyder was aware of problems in Flint’s water supply in 2014, when an advisory was sent out because of bacteria found in the water. Michigan Department of Environmental Quality staffers were made aware of warning signs for lead in the water on Feb. 27, at the latest, by an Environmental Protection Agency water expert.
The emails paint a picture of an administration working on the problem but dragging its feet until early October. At that point, the skepticism about a potential problem suddenly turned into action plans.
As late as Sept. 26, Dennis Muchmore, Snyder’s then-chief of staff, said it was up to the city of Flint to deal with the problem. He added that the Department of Environmental Quality and Department of Health and Human Services couldn’t find evidence of a major change in the water.
That was after Virginia Tech researchers and a doctor from a local hospital released studies showing lead was present in drinking water at homes and in children’s blood, respectively.
“The residents are caught in a swirl of misinformation and long-term distrust of local government is unlikely to be resolved,” Muchmore wrote.
In April 2014, Flint switched its water source from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department, which draws water from Lake Huron, to a local agency that also would take water from the lake.
However, the infrastructure needed to get water from Lake Huron to Flint under the new agency was not yet built, so an emergency manager appointed by Gov. Rick Snyder decided to take water from the Flint River as a temporary measure.
The water from the Flint River is so polluted and acidic that the water ate away at the lead pipes bringing water to the city’s homes.
At the same time Muchmore sent his email, Geralyn Lasher, the Department of Health and Human Service’s deputy director of external relations and communications, cast aspersions on the study from a local doctor.
A study by the Hurley Medical Center found the amount of children with too much lead in their systems rose from 2 percent to 4.1 percent after the change in water supply.
The study also reported the share of children who live in the most affected parts of the city with elevated lead levels in their blood increased from 2.5 percent to 6.3 percent. The number of children in Flint under the age of 15 months who tested positive for higher lead levels increased two-and-a-half times after the switch.
Lasher wrote that the state could not replicate the tests and put the word “data” in quotes when referring to the study.
“Epidemiologists continue to review the ‘data’ provided by a Hurley hospital physician that showed an increase in lead activity following the change in water supply,” Lasher wrote. “While we continue to review this data, we have stated publicly that Hurley conducted their analysis in a much different way than we do at the department.”
Earlier that month, Thomas Saxton, the chief deputy treasurer, said he had met with Flint officials about a call between state treasury officials and Flint city officials.
Saxton seemed to imply that the city was asking for money to make sure they could pay off lawsuits filed against the city for jacking up water rates after the switch was made in April 2014.
“As indicated they asked about the status of the $30mm request to the governor,” Saxton wrote. “Which coincidently is the ballpark number they are at risk for in the rate lawsuit(s).”
However, in early October the mood changed in the state capital.
Suddenly, on Oct. 1, actions plans were being drafted for state intervention in Flint. Two weeks after that, Dan Wyant, the top environmental official in Michigan, said his staff did not do the necessary testing.
The state had not required Flint to use corrosion control in its pipes. Instead, it allowed for one full year of testing to determine if the city had to introduce corrosion control chemicals into the water supply to make sure lead pipes did not corrode into drinking water.
“Simply said, our staff believed they were constrained by two consecutive six-month tests,” Wyant wrote. “We followed and defended that protocol. I believe now we made a mistake.”
