“There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen.” I have seen this quote, attributed to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, trotted out several times in the past few days. In extraordinary times, cliches take on added weight. Given how resonant the quote feels, we are doubtlessly living through extraordinary times. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is not merely a security crisis in Eastern Europe. It is likely to reorder the world in lasting ways. One can feel the change in the air, even if it’s difficult to discern the shape of things to come fully. Something is ending — perhaps, as the historian Hal Brands recently wrote, the so-called liberal world order, or at least the comfortable fictions about the durability of moral and economic progress that had seemed to take root under the umbrella of uncontested American hegemony. Something is being born — the truly multipolar world.
It is not a foregone conclusion that America itself, or even more broadly speaking “the West,” will be weaker in this multipolar world. By some measures, the West may even come out stronger.
But the limits of its power will be much more clearly marked out. And that will have profound implications for the future.
The Ukrainian people stand to lose the most from this war. At the time of writing, more than a million have fled the country. And as the war gets more brutal (as most analysts agree it must), those numbers are sure to swell. Some estimate that up to 7 million people are likely to be displaced, but that, too, could be exceeded if the Russians choose to escalate. Ukrainians have the right to visa-free travel within the European Union for up to 90 days. Unlike with refugees from the war in Syria, Europe appears to be preparing to allow Ukrainians to stay for three years. The war could easily drag on for longer than that, and those who leave will start new lives in their adopted countries. The Ukrainian people have made it clear they will not be erased, but the state they were hard at work building and developing lies in ruins, and is unlikely to be restored.
Ukrainians’ loss will not be Russia’s gain, however. Most military assessments see the Russian military grinding out some kind of tactical win in the war, though it’s not clear what that win will look like. It appears that Russian planners genuinely did not foresee encountering resistance from Ukrainian fighters. As a result, the first few days of the invasion have seen Russian setbacks. Morale appears to be low among the invaders. There have been desertions and surrenders, with anecdotal evidence suggesting that many soldiers were not told much about their mission. Problems with logistics are compounding these difficulties. Much of this could be corrected over time, and indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin may insist operations continue for a while, if only to restore some credibility to his military machine.
After a week of fighting, Russia’s armed forces look a lot less impressive than they have in the recent past. Syria was a brutal but effective war for Russia’s modernizing army, albeit waged largely from the air. A ground invasion has revealed many of its unaddressed weaknesses and debilities. The nuclear saber-rattling Moscow engaged in after the war’s early days can be seen as a reminder that, by dint of possessing world-destroying weapons, Russia must not be seen as a second-rate military power, even if evidence suggests it might be just that.
Putin’s political endgame in Ukraine is difficult to discern. He might eventually be able to suborn the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv or its second city, Kharkiv, though it no longer seems likely he will be able to do so quickly. Russia may be able to secure a land bridge to occupied Crimea, linking it up with expanded holdings in Luhansk and Donetsk in the east of the country. It may move to occupy Odessa, Ukraine’s main port on the Black Sea, the outlet for most of Ukraine’s trade with the rest of the world. It might even try to take the whole country, including the beautiful city of Lviv in the west. But taking and holding are not the same thing. Early scenes in smaller towns in Ukraine have seen citizens coming out to the streets and abusing occupying soldiers guarding municipal buildings. If such protests turn violent, will Russians shoot down the protesters? If they do, that will only provide fuel for an insurgency that is already finding its legs.
A U.S. government analysis that was briefed to Congress raised the possibility of the war lasting decades. That suggests the United States is preparing to fuel the Ukrainian insurgency from bases in neighboring Poland. The idea is to turn Ukraine into a trap for Russia — a meat grinder for its soldiers and an economic millstone around its neck. On the other hand, if Russia will be able to continue to fight for that long, we are likely about to see the limits of Western coercive power. The U.S. and Europe have used most of the leverage at the alliance’s disposal in the globalized economy on Russia. By sanctioning the country’s central bank, freezing its reserves held abroad, and disconnecting it from the SWIFT interbank messaging system, the West went nonmilitarily “nuclear.” More sanctions are available, and Western companies are scrambling to divest themselves of their holdings in Russia. Major Western energy companies are cutting their ties with Gazprom and Rosneft, Russia’s state-owned gas and oil companies. But the central bank seems to have been able to stabilize the ruble after an initial crash, and global energy prices are soaring. Russia holds 25% of the world’s proven gas reserves and provides 38% of Europe’s gas. Even if the Europeans were able to immediately wean themselves off Russian supplies, other buyers will surely step in.
Dark times lie ahead for the Russian people, and Putin may have been taken off guard by how quickly pressure was brought to bear. But it’s far from impossible to imagine that he will be able to survive. If some kind of coup does not materialize, it will be because Putin’s hold on power was stronger than the power of the sanctions being used to loosen it.
And China? So far, Beijing is standing back and watching. It has not openly backed Moscow, but neither is it rushing to condemn its aggression. Its abstention on an angry resolution at the United Nations is symbolic of its larger approach. Russia’s early troubles in conquering Ukraine are carefully being studied for any lessons that could apply to Taiwan. Moscow is invading its neighbor from three sides. The two countries share a massive land border, and with Belarus reduced to client status, Russia is able to funnel troops to the theater almost completely unobstructed. Taiwan is an island, and its population is not likely to be less defiant than the Ukrainians are proving to be. Beijing will not be deterred from its territorial ambitions, but its war plans are sure to be adjusted in the coming months.
Moreover, China sees many economic opportunities in the years ahead. As long as Putin holds on to power, most of the sanctions and divestments will stay in place. Europe is united as never before in outrage at Russian aggression but will be hurt by being forced to decouple economically. As the dust settles and passions cool, China will continue its economic games on the continent. More importantly, it will snatch up most of the assets that are now rendered toxic for Western investors and multinationals, especially in Russia’s energy sector, and it will have much more political leverage over an isolated Moscow. The United States could soon wake up to a Chinese powerhouse, an increasingly high-tech economy with unfettered access to all of Russia’s resource wealth.
For its part, America will come out stronger. Russia, one of its main geopolitical competitors, will be bogged down in a grueling war, with its allies in Europe strongly engaged in making sure it is as painful as possible. The German about-face on defense spending represents a real sea-change for Europe. The political scientist Charles Tilly observed that “war makes the state, and the state makes war.” It’s probably premature to conclude that the EU will emerge as a state-level player on the other side of the crisis, but some level of additional continental cohesion will certainly follow. More equitable burden-sharing on the continent means that resources will be available for the long-prophesied “pivot to Asia.” High energy prices will revive America’s struggling shale gas and oil industries and could make the kind of military buildup necessary to contain China successfully less painful than it otherwise might have been.
But a stronger America no longer means a globally predominant America. As noted above, China is likely to emerge an even more formidable challenger in the coming years. The idea of “great power competition,” first articulated in the Trump administration’s national security strategy, was until this moment playing out in a world still shaped by American hegemony. After Ukraine, the United States’s antagonists, China chief among them, will have a much better sense of the limits of American power. Expect a lot more jostling, testing, and brinkmanship in the years to come. The competition will not be peaceful.
Damir Marusic is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and co-founder of Wisdom of Crowds.
