At this point, not even the self-styled Wonk Class was staying up late in anticipation of the Obama Administration’s release of its long-overdue National Security Strategy (NSS), which has at last been published. The last one came out five years ago, and the president has been promising an update since the fall of 2013.
Even though much of the purpose of such formal documents is to avoid making headlines, there are inevitable news nuggets that do reflect the unique ways in which administrations consider America’s security challenges; a good example would be the passages on preemptive war in George W. Bush’s 2002 NSS.
In the case of the new Obama strategy, the most revealing section is that which asserts the administration’s determination to “lead with a long-term perspective.” While it first of all reflects this president’s “I-see-farther” intellectual vanity, the section is also a good summation of ideas “trending” among the sorts of people who have made the 100-most-influential-thinkers lists of the past decade. It’s a boiled-down syrup of what the Strategy Smart Set thinks, listing five “historical transitions” that have “significantly changed the security landscape.” They are:
· “Power among states is more dynamic.” Beyond noting that prosperity has become more widespread, the NSS observes that, “India’s potential, China’s rise and Russia’s aggression all significantly impact the future of major power relations.” This, conveniently, glosses over the single most important factor: the choice by the United States, during Barack Obama’s term of office, to step backward from its position of global preeminence. India’s potential remains just that; objectively, Russia is very weak and getting weaker; even the pace of China’s economic rise is slowing. If the power relationships among states are more dynamic, it’s because of increased uncertainty about the role the United States sees for itself.
· “Power is shifting below and beyond the nation-state.” Futurists have been yammering about “hyper-powered individuals” and groups and the decline of the Westphalian state system for some time now – arguably since 1648. If not before, that is: Martin Luther and John Calvin were individuals who had a hyper-powered effect on the international politics of their time. There have been trans-national empires and entities through most of recorded history. States have never enjoyed a real monopoly on power, as indeed the Treaty of Westphalia acknowledged in making Sweden and France the guarantors of the system and security within the Holy Roman Empire. The struggle for power has always included a range of actors: states, sub-states, super-states and individuals.
· “The increasing interdependence of the global economy and rapid pace of technological change are linking individuals, groups and governments in unprecedented ways.” Perhaps. But it remains to be seen if the 21st century can match the 16th century – when the discovery, colonization and economic exploitation of America profoundly changed the international balance of power, sparking centuries of European and then American global dominance. What’s happening now is surely a quantitative change, but it’s far from clear that it will result in a qualitative change in geopolitics.
· “A struggle for power is underway among and within the many states of the Middle East and North Africa.” Who thought this administration would never admit this? For to do so is to damn for all eternity the central tenet of its strategy, which is for American to back off and back Iran in the contest. The collapse of the old order marked by the so-called “Arab Spring” might have led past U.S. administrations either to double down on Sunni Arab autocrats, or, perhaps, to double down on what we Americans believe is the universal desire for democracy. Either way, we would have recognized the importance of the conflict for U.S. national security interests. The Obama answer – for the United States to step back while helping Iran to step up – has been to strive to create the worst of all possible worlds.
· “The global energy market has changed dramatically.” Well, duh. It just hasn’t changed in the ways that the administration forecast or wished. Shale has produced a “brown” energy revolution, not the “green” one Obama wanted and on which he’s squandered hundreds of billions of dollars – although, by helping reduce the use of coal, the glut of oil and gas has had more favorable environmental impacts than would an ocean of windmill farms or Solyndras. But it’s far from clear that the energy revolution has revolutionized international politics or power: Neither China’s lack of energy resources nor Russia’s surfeit of them has had much effect on their behavior or aggressive tendencies. Lacking a military option to halt Iran’s regional advances, the Saudis and their Gulf allies are pumping every barrel they can to forestall the day of Iranian hegemony in the region. But its hasn’t really worked. The price of gas has plummeted, but that has yet to change the power equation in the Middle East.
The section concludes with the understatement that “today’s strategic environment is fluid.” Properly understood, that is for the administration to give itself a failing grade, to admit that it’s let the world slip more out of its control. Barack Obama’s approach to power and international politics has been forever detached and passive; he’s been more observer than participant – let alone the world’s most “hyper-powered individual.” His kind of long-term approach has been, rather than a guide to action, a reason for inaction.
