The Marines of the future

Berger argued that the Marine Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of great power competition against China. As Berger wrote in an article explaining his actions:

Accordingly, Berger’s planning guidance features three major changes: a focus on China and the Indo-Pacific region, a return to the Corps’ naval roots, and a willingness to change force structure and acquisition priorities radically.

His assessment is based on the recognition that for some time, China has been pursuing what’s known as an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, which in this case plays out through Beijing’s deployment of a layered cruise and ballistic missile system to threaten U.S. and allied forces operating in the Western Pacific. Berger intends for the Marines to counter China’s strategy by focusing on the “first island chain,” which is a barrier running parallel to China and stretching from Japan to the South China Sea, in conjunction with other U.S. forces and allies.

By defending key maritime terrain using widely dispersed forces, capable of engaging ships and aircraft from a great distance, Marines could make large swathes of the Pacific Ocean off-limits to China’s navy. But operating within the range of enemy precision fires requires many new capabilities, including high-endurance loitering sensors and munitions and advanced air defense systems.

Berger’s guidance also signals the return of the Marine Corps to its naval roots. The Marines will be naval not only in character but also in purpose, focusing on achieving and maintaining sea control in contested regions. He writes that the Marine Corps of today and tomorrow is “a fleet marine force that could go ashore, instead of a land force that could go on a ship.” This is a return to the model that prevailed during the Pacific campaign of World War II, when the Marines were tasked with the seizure of advanced naval bases.

Finally, since the Marines will fight as a dispersed maritime force, Berger has indicated that he plans to shift investment from expensive legacy platforms to large numbers of cheap, small, expendable systems enabling naval forces, Navy and Marine, to operate effectively inside a contested zone even if they absorb substantial losses.

Webb’s critique

Webb levels two sets of criticisms of Berger’s vision. The first is substantive, relating to problems with the proposed force structure changes; the second is with the process (or lack thereof) Berger followed to reach his decision.

Regarding the first, Berger’s force structure changes include: (1) eliminating several infantry battalions; (2) reducing the number of Marines in the remaining battalions; and (3) eliminating two reserve-component battalions, 16 cannon artillery battalions (to be replaced by 14 rocket artillery battalions), all of its tanks, and multiple tilt-rotor, heavy-lift helicopter, and attack helicopter squadrons. Webb writes that “among Marines there are serious questions about the wisdom and long-term risk of dramatic reductions in force structure, weapon systems and manpower levels in units that would take steady casualties in most combat scenarios. … The realities of brutal combat and the wide array of global challenges the Marine Corps faces daily argue strongly against a doctrinal experiment that might look good in a computerized war game at Quantico.”

Regarding the second, Webb reports that a number of high-ranking Marines share his concern: “Recently, 22 retired four-star Marine generals signed a nonpublic letter of concern to Gen. Berger, and many others have stated their support of the letter.” Webb notes that, had Berger been more open about his changes, including explaining either their necessity or the benefit to be derived from them, 90% of retired generals would have supported him. Webb and these other retired officers are concerned that Berger’s planned changes are so momentous they never should have been done without a full review and debate.

In defense of Berger

There is no question that Berger’s vision entails substantial risks, but so does maintaining the status quo: possible irrelevance in light of changing geopolitical circumstances. The great strength of the Marine Corps has always been its adaptability and flexibility. In 1954, the eminent political scientist Samuel Huntington introduced the idea of a “strategic concept,” which he defined as “the fundamental element of [a] service — its role or purpose in implementing national policy.” A service’s strategic concept answers the “ultimate question: What function do you perform which obligates society to assume responsibility for your maintenance?”

The centerpiece of the World War II Marine Corps’ strategic concept was the conduct of amphibious assaults against a defended beach in order to seize advanced naval bases in support of a naval campaign. During the Cold War, the Marine Corps reinvented itself as an expeditionary “force in readiness,” capable of responding with tailored, task-organized forces to any crisis across the spectrum of conflict, including short-fuse contingencies that could arise at any time or any place. In pursuit of its postwar strategic concept, it constantly developed new operational concepts. But it also fought in sustained ground combat in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, duplicating the role of the U.S. Army.

This “jack of all trades” understanding has led some, on the one hand, to question the very purpose of the Marine Corps and, on the other, to ask if we really need two land armies. This “institutional paranoia” is a recurring issue for the Marines. As the old saying goes, “just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not out to get you.” Throughout its history, the Marine Corps has often been targeted for extinction by both the Navy and Army. Between 1829 and 1932, there were four attempts either to merge the Marines with the Army or to abolish the service altogether. Even their successes in World War II did not inoculate the Marines from attempts to get rid of them. Linking the Marines’ strategic concept to a particular strategic problem — countering China’s A2/AD strategy — does what wedding the Marine Corps to War Plan ORANGE did in the interwar period.

Indeed, Berger’s initiative is reminiscent of that of another Marine commandant, John A. Lejeune, in the period following World War I. In that capacity, he confronted the question of the Corps’ future. Two options were based on the Marines’ history.

The first was to continue to function as colonial infantry in “small wars” as they had in Haiti and Nicaragua. These were the “bushwhackers” such as Smedley Butler. The second option was to organize for sustained land combat as the Marines had in France in 1918. Indeed, the 4th Marine Brigade had been a part of the Army’s 2nd Division, and Lejeune himself had commanded that Army division during the victorious action at St. Mihiel. Had they pursued this option, it is likely that the Marines would have been absorbed by the U.S. Army.

There was a third option, one based on the changing geopolitical situation: a likely confrontation with Japan. This option envisioned amphibious operations to seize advanced naval bases across the Central Pacific in support of War Plan ORANGE. There was a great deal of risk associated with this option. For one thing, the feasibility of amphibious operations had been called into question by the British failure at Gallipoli.

But Lejeune bet the Corps’ future on naval campaigns in support of War Plan ORANGE, the attempt to solve a particular strategic problem: how to project U.S. naval and air power across the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean to bring the home islands of Japan under attack.

In response, Lejeune’s brilliant protege, Maj. Pete Ellis, led a team that developed the doctrine for amphibious operations — shore bombardment, ship-to-shore movement, assault against a defended beach, consolidation of the beachhead, and further operations ashore to secure the island — that would be required to seize the necessary bases.

Berger’s strategy has the character of a John Lejeune-War Plan ORANGE enterprise. Berger’s intent to reintegrate Marine and Navy forces is also part of a larger “counter-revolution in maritime affairs” that returns naval forces to their historical role of defeating an adversary at sea and in contested spaces rather than simply maintaining freedom of navigation on the global commons. Berger sees the Marines as an extension of the fleet, asking, “What can Marines do to help the fleet commander fight his fleet?”

Some have criticized Berger’s focus on the conduct of a naval campaign. But as in the case of Lejeune and War Plan ORANGE, this is a recognition of geopolitical reality. In the final analysis, the U.S. Pacific Fleet is the mechanism by which we will prevail, or not, in the event of a war with China.

Berger has identified a comprehensive vision of what the Marine Corps will do in the future, established a set of priorities, and outlined a strategy to execute his vision. Of course, implementing this vision will be the real challenge. He will have to confront shrinking resources and entrenched political, business, and bureaucratic interests. But he should take solace in the example of Lejeune.

Mackubin Owens is a senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and author of U.S. Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain. He is currently writing a history of U.S. civil-military relations.