US strategic position eroding as Philippines cozies up to China

Chinese naval exercises off the coast of the Philippines this summer finally forced the hand of President Rodrigo Duterte, if only for six months.

Despite a friendly relationship with President Trump, the Filipino president had maintained a hard line against the United States while continuing to appease China.

Promised Chinese economic investments, infrastructure development, and jobs were not forthcoming to boost the populist Duterte. Meanwhile, popular support for China is plummeting in the Philippines, and the Filipino military is growing concerned by Chinese activity near the disputed Spratly Islands.

Duterte’s June 1 rapprochement with the U.S. was measured: a six-month delay in the suspension of a Visiting Forces Agreement set to expire with the U.S.

Decades of close military-to-military cooperation with the U.S., a Mutual Defense Agreement dating back to the 1950s and assistance fighting Abu Sayyaf al Qaeda and Islamic State-linked terrorists in the south have not swayed Duterte to embrace the U.S. over China.

The U.S. struggle to right defense relations with the Philippines is an increasingly stubborn challenge, flying in the face of America’s Indo-Pacific goals, namely, preventing China from exercising a claim to the entire South China Sea.

“The United States-Philippines people to people ties are extraordinarily deep and have gone back for a very long time,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Cmdr. Adm. Phil Davidson told the Washington Examiner recently.

The question posed concerned military-to-military relations. These days, the U.S. has to rely on historical friendships and make the case that a partnership with America means security in times of crisis, such as when Islamic State-linked rebels took terrain in the southern Philippines three years ago.

“I would also say that our mil-to-mil ties, particularly in the wake of the seizures in Marawi in 2017 have been almost completely restored,” he said.

Davidson highlighted the recent suspension of the termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement between the U.S. and the Pacific island nation as a lukewarm sign of progress.

“If you can tolerate that double negative statement of it, which puts us in a better place,” he said. “I absolutely welcome the opportunity to continue to work with the Philippines.”

The trouble for U.S. plans to counter Chinese great power influence in the Pacific is that Duterte is not as welcoming.

Duterte’s cold shoulder

Herman Kraft, a University of the Philippines political science chair and regional security expert, explained to the Washington Examiner that Duterte’s disregard for the U.S. defense partnership has much to do with his view of America’s diminishing influence.

“He probably agrees with the idea that the United States is actually a power that is in decline and China is actually an emergent power,” Kraft said via Zoom from Manila. “China has always been associated with economic largess.”

Kraft said economic ties to mainland China are outsize compared to trade with the U.S.

“It’s really more a sense that the Philippines are better off guaranteeing its future working with China rather than the United States,” he explained.

“In his eyes,” Kraft said of Duterte’s calculus. “The security relationship between the Philippines and the United States is something that’s totally unnecessary.”

The Center for Strategic and International Studies’s John Schaus told the Washington Examiner that relations with the Philippines are at their lowest in decades.

“Under Duterte, at least over the last three or four years, the U.S.-Philippines relationship is in its toughest place since 1991-’92,” he said.

That’s when a previous basing agreement expired over similarly nationalistic concerns, and the U.S. was forced to abandon Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Complex.

“He wants a more independent Philippines that is less dependent on the United States,” Schaus added.

The Asian security expert argued that cozying up to China is a means to an end for Duterte.

“One of Duterte’s goals is to grow the economy and create jobs and improve standards of living and China’s providing concrete, immediate benefits,” he said.

Military-to-military ties with the U.S., however, are institutionalized and deeply embedded.

“The security relationship is seen as something that is important,” Kraft said of the Armed Forces of the Philippines concerns with Chinese claims of land and water features within Philippines waters.

“The security relationship with the United States has become much more tangible,” he said.

Davidson said he has regular virtual dialogue with his AFP counterparts and the Philippines liaison at INDOPACOM headquarters in Hawaii.

“We have a longstanding alliance, and we look forward to continued, close security and defense cooperation in the Philippines,” he said.

INDOPACOM spokesman Maj. Randy Ready told the Washington Examiner that the Philippines Navy missile-frigate BRP Jose Rizal will also be participating in this month’s RIMPAC exercise in Hawaii.

Davidson added that Special Operations Forces operate in an advise and assist role in Mindanao and to the south, part of Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, and overseas contingency operation to counter ISIS affiliates and other violent extremists.

“We have a number of special operators and support people that continue to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines,” Davidson said. “We’ll continue to have a relationship, strongly.”

Deterring China

Within months of Duterte’s suspension of the VFA, China began to encroach on Philippines waters. The move was in direct violation of a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruling against China in a territorial dispute with the Philippines.

“They have increased their presence in and around Philippine-occupied features in the South China Sea,” said Schaus. “As China stepped up its presence, Duterte realized maybe now isn’t the right time to step back from the alliance.”

The U.S. also stepped up its freedom of navigation transits and aircraft carrier exercises, conducting two dual-carrier exercises in the South China Sea and the Philippines Sea.

Kraft explained that the VFA is about continuing U.S. involvement in the Philippines, from joint exercises to assuring an American response in a time of crisis.

“There’s a concern that China is overreaching,” he said.

In a recent State of the Nation address, Duterte made it clear that Philippines bases will not be used by the U.S. against China in a conflict.

Kraft said the U.S. does not need Filipino bases to operate in the South China Sea. Further, the mere presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines reduces Chinese aggression against neighbors.

“It’s not so much that the United States can actually use their Philippine deployment against China,” he said. “The way to actually look at it is that the fact that they’re here and can deploy in the South China Sea has some sort of effect on Chinese activities in the region.”

Kraft believes the AFP is increasingly concerned about China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. The military’s cornerstone role in Duterte’s hardline administration means he too must respect their wishes.

“It’s clear that the Philippine military actually prefers keeping the VFA, keeping all the operational aspects that the VFA actually makes possible,” he said.

“Duterte is careful about how he manages the relationship with the military,” Kraft said. “He is very careful about what he tries to push as far as weakening the relationship between the Philippines and the United States.”

Schaus said without the U.S., the Philippines is “going to have a harder time being a credible deterrent to Chinese incursions.”

“It was as much a signal to the Chinese to back off as it was a signal to the U.S. of a change of heart,” he said of the June 1 VFA announcement.

INDOPACOM declined to comment further on the nature of U.S.-Philippines military ties so to allow the State Department to continue negotiations before the six-month suspension expires in November.

The future of U.S.-Philippines military relations are still at risk, said both experts, with the results of the U.S. presidential election a factor in whether Duterte allows the VFA to expire.

“Those ties are strong,” said Schaus. “But without constant renewal, they atrophy.”

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