The U.S. military is more top-heavy than it ever has been, after decades of adding generals and admirals while the enlisted ranks shrank and budget cuts forced many lower-ranking officers out of the service.
It’s a problem known as “star creep,” and it has resisted efforts by lawmakers and the Pentagon to reverse it, though many now say it’s time to act as the military faces new challenges such as the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and a fight to stop the spread of the Ebola virus in Africa.
A key reason for the problem, according to the Government Accountability Office: The Pentagon doesn’t know how many generals and admirals it needs to lead a shrinking force.
A new GAO report found that the Defense Department hasn’t updated its requirements for the number of generals and admirals it needs since 2003. Meanwhile, the number of generals and admirals has grown 8 percent from 871 in 2001 to 943 in 2013, while the enlisted population has shrunk 2 percent during that period, increasing the proportion of generals to troops.
To make matters worse, GAO found that the Pentagon did not know the full cost of the military’s top leaders because it had not adequately tracked expenses associated with the perks of high rank, such as aides and personal security details.
“As the department realigns itself to address new challenges, full awareness of the [general and flag officer] requirements and costs would help the department to provide congressional decision makers with the information needed for effective oversight and help ensure the efficient use of resources,” GAO said.
The report recommends that the Pentagon conduct a comprehensive review of its requirements for generals and admirals, along with efforts to better define the true costs of each position, including the expense of associated perks.
What GAO found mirrors a June 2013 study from the centrist think tank Third Way, which noted that the ratio of officers to enlisted troops had more than doubled since World War II and was then at a record high, especially in the highest ranks.
“A top-heavy military undermines military effectiveness because it slows decision-making, impairs adaptability and funnels resources from the warfighter to administrative personnel,” researcher Ben Freeman wrote in the report. “The top-heaviness also increases costs at a time of shrinking defense budgets. Taxpayers are paying more for fewer troops.”
The problem was supposed to be fixed by a March 2011 efficiency directive from then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates that ordered the military to shed 102 generals and admirals. But it was never fully implemented.
Freeman, then working for the Project on Government Oversight, a nonprofit, nonpartisan watchdog group, said at a Sept. 14, 2011, hearing of a Senate Armed Services subcommittee that the rise of joint commands was likely the reason for “star creep.” The number of such joint commands has continued to grow — for example, U.S. Cyber Command, which is led by a four-star general, was created in 2009 to lead efforts in that developing field of warfare.
Also contributing is the prestige factor. At the same hearing, then-Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Philip Breedlove argued that the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe should be a four-star general because of that post’s NATO responsibilities — at a time when the Army had reduced the rank of its European commander from a four-star to a three-star billet.
“So as the other allied nations in Europe are four stars, we are advocating for a four-star U.S. commander to be able to do that,” said Breedlove, who is now NATO supreme allied commander in Europe.
But the reasons for a top-heavy officer corps don’t seem so important with military leaders and lawmakers increasingly concerned that shrinking defense budgets are hurting U.S. combat readiness and the ability to respond to new threats such as the rise of the Islamic State and Russian assertiveness in Eastern Europe.
And bloated ranks of generals and admirals don’t sit well amid highly publicized, budget-driven reductions in other ranks, such as the Army’s decision to force out some 550 majors and nearly 1,200 captains— some of them serving in combat in Afghanistan.
“That doesn’t seem right to me,” Rep. Morgan Griffith, R-Va., told the Washington Examiner when asked about the GAO report. “There ought to be some formula that gives you at least a range of where you need to be.”
He and Rep. Keith Ellison, D-Minn., sponsored an amendment to the House-passed fiscal 2015 defense policy bill that would require the Pentagon to implement the 2011 directive from Gates by the end of next year, resulting in the elimination of 33 positions by attrition.
The Senate is expected to consider the legislation after the November elections.
Griffith said that even though new threats might lead to the need for more generals and admirals, “I still think you need to have more of a rational disbursement between your leaders and your soldiers.”
