A liberal history of conservatism

Dispassionate scholarly examinations of the political Right are unfortunately rare. For some scholars on the Left, the temptation to pathologize conservatives, to treat conservative resistance to change as a kind of mental illness, is irresistible. This has been true at least since Theodor Adorno and his colleagues published The Authoritarian Personality in 1950. Other left-wing critics are eager to dismiss right-wing thought as little more than a cynical defense of unearned privileges.

Conservative scholars have their own blind spots, especially when it comes to sensitive topics such as race and civil rights. Even fine historians such as George Nash have downplayed those aspects of conservatism’s history that make the contemporary center-right uneasy. Less scrupulous conservative writers, such as Dinesh D’Souza, are rightfully critiqued for presenting a brazenly dishonest picture of their movement’s history.

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Conservatism: The Fight for a Tradition, by Edmund Fawcett. Princeton University Press, 544 pp., $35.

Edmund Fawcett’s new book, Conservatism: The Fight for a Tradition, is a rare examination of conservatism that avoids these pitfalls. Fawcett is decidedly on the Left and never claims his book is objective. But he approaches his subject from a perspective that results in a clear-eyed analysis. As a left-wing liberal, he wants to know, “If we’re so smart, how come we’re not in charge?” Although he never really answers that question, he provides a fair-minded tour of conservative thought, beginning with anti-revolutionary thinkers such as Joseph de Maistre and Edmund Burke and concluding with contemporary conservatives such as Roger Scruton and Rod Dreher.

The book efficiently covers an extraordinary amount of intellectual and historical ground, traversing multiple centuries and four countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), divided into four periods (1830-1880, 1880-1945, 1945-1980, 1980-present). The work’s geographic and temporal scope is its most notable strength. To assist readers who may become confused by the dizzying number of politicians and intellectuals he discusses, Fawcett includes a helpful appendix providing brief biographical sketches of his subjects.

American conservatives have long viewed their movement as sui generis, disconnected from and superior to European right-wing thought. Fawcett suggests this view is mistaken, demonstrating that conservatives faced similar dilemmas in all four countries at roughly the same time, often reaching similar conclusions and pursuing similar strategies independently of one another. Both American and European conservatives, for instance, successfully stymied nascent socialist movements in their respective countries. His open-minded discussion of German conservatism is especially refreshing, as he rejects the notion that 19th-century right-wing German thought is nothing but prologue to Adolf Hitler and the Holocaust.

In each historical period, Fawcett divides conservatives according to their willingness to accommodate irrepressible social changes: There are those who accept, in some form or another, the rise of democracy, secularism, capitalism, and the welfare state, and then there are the “unreconciled” conservatives who refuse to compromise. He convincingly argues that a powerful center-right that accepts basic liberal premises is essential to liberal democracy. But he worries that the centrist Right he respects is giving way to a dangerous “hard right,” the unreconciled Right of this generation, which he sees on the march throughout Western democracies. He implores today’s conservatives to choose the path of moderation and accommodation rather than right-wing revanchism.

To make the case that conservatives should accept and even embrace the march of liberalism, he points out that conservative parties that accept progressive change have historically enjoyed remarkable political success at the ballot box. I suspect many conservatives will find this argument unsatisfying.

It is true that conservatives who reconcile themselves to progressive victories can keep their army on the political field, confident that they will fight another day. But I wonder if conservatives will be content to accept that there will always be a political movement calling itself “conservative” if the price of keeping that movement viable is accepting irrevocable social changes that they personally abhor. Are there any points on which conservatives can legitimately dig in their heels? If not, does that mean that conservatives are a threat to democracy unless they accept their status as permanent losers, at best delaying progressive victories but never overturning them? And if that’s the case, then what exactly are conservatives trying to conserve?

Conservatism is strongest when Fawcett limits his own commentary. He explains at the outset of the book that he strenuously disagrees with most of his subjects, which should have been sufficient. But he frequently feels compelled to pause his story to explain his own misgivings with certain conservative arguments. As the book drags on, his voice becomes increasingly pronounced, interrupting the narrative’s flow.

Fawcett is very concerned about the “hard right,” yet his explanation of it is confusing and perhaps simply wrong. He describes today’s hard Right as a bizarre alliance between extreme free-market globalists and xenophobic nationalists, which, if it existed, would be strange indeed. Both groups can be found on the Right, but Fawcett overstates the degree to which they are simpatico. In his discussion of contemporary right-wing intellectuals, for instance, he is unable to point to any that embrace both positions, and cooperation between the two camps is usually provisional and tense. The nationalist and globalist factions on the Right are more hostile toward each other than Fawcett suggests, and his claim that “the Left is everywhere in retreat” is, in my view, an exaggeration.

Despite these misgivings, Conservatism is a tremendous work of scholarship, worth reading regardless of one’s position on the political spectrum. I doubt anyone will read it without learning something new and important. It will unquestionably be remembered as one of the most important, comprehensive studies of conservative thought ever published.

George Hawley is an associate professor of political science at the University of Alabama and the author of The Alt-Right: What Everyone Needs to Know.

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