Announcing the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, then-Secretary of State John Kerry said that the agreement marked a “measurable step away from the prospect of nuclear proliferation, towards transparency and cooperation.” The administration, though, was far from transparent or cooperative about explaining the Iran deal. Lost in the discussion of whether President Trump should re-certify Iran as compliant with the JCPOA by next month is the basic fact that there’s still a lot about the deal lawmakers and the public don’t know.
Kerry’s announcement of the deal in July 2015 marked the first time congressional leaders and other observers had a chance to see details; many were horrified. As has been well documented, the deal made numerous significant concessions to Iran, and the JCPOA allowed Iran to retain a patient pathway to a nuclear weapon, even if it abided strictly by the letter of the agreement.
While Kerry insisted the negotiations were exclusively about the nuclear program, it soon emerged that a cash-for-hostages swap was also a secret feature of the deal. The White House denied the two actions were related, but the transfer of Americans in exchange for pallets of cash had been precisely timed, giving away yet another cover-up.
It also became clear that the administration was covering up other aspects of the agreement not in the released text. For instance, we learned that the International Atomic Energy Agency and Iran had struck a quiet side deal which permitted a one-time environmental sampling at the notorious Parchin military research and development center, but by Iranian personnel, not impartial IAEA inspectors. This fact was only revealed after two Republican members of Congress—Sen. Tom Cotton and now-CIA director Mike Pompeo—traveled to Vienna to investigate.
Most troubling was the closure of the so-called PMD file, which was at the very crux of the West’s concern: the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s secret uranium enrichment program. Many of the PMD questions revolved around getting a proper understanding of what was going on at Parchin. To this day, no public accounting of the specifics of why the IAEA hurriedly closed the file has ever been presented.
The closure of the PMD file was consequential: Doing so effectively let Tehran avoid ever having to answer questions from international organizations about the history of the program. Despite years of Iranian stonewalling on numerous important questions about the program, the IAEA inexplicably washed its hands of the PMD file, allowing the JCPOA to proceed to Implementation Day, delisting hundreds of sanctioned people and organizations.
How many other secret portions of the deal remain undisclosed today? Are there benefits Iran derived from the agreement that we don’t yet know about? Was the IAEA somehow pressured into closing the PMD file?
It was reported last week that President Trump was “leaning” against re-certifying the deal, which could kick the issue to Congress or the P5+1 for renegotiation, depending on what he decided. Even if the Trump administration has sufficient data to make such a decision, however, elected officials and the public certainly do not.
While the public does not necessarily need to have total visibility into the inner workings of the JCPOA, releasing more data would give think tanks and other observers greater confidence in the administration’s eventual certification decision. Congress, on the other hand, deserves to have a more complete understanding not only of what remains secret about the Iran Deal, but also how the Trump administration is going to evaluate Tehran’s compliance. This should not be controversial.
Some countries, including Germany (the +1 of the P5+1), have reported that Iran is attempting to acquire “dual-use” items, or those with both civilian and military applications, of possible proliferation concern. While the outgoing Obama administration dodged this inconvenient report a full year after the signing of the JCPOA, the new Congress and White House assuredly must want to hear more about these reports.
And what about the actual implementation of the deal? There is virtually no transparency into the deliberations of the P5+1’s “Joint Commission,” which is supposed to track compliance and adjudicate disputes. The EU puts out a short, anodyne press release after every meeting, but it’s unclear whether everything’s sailing along smoothly or if there are genuine disagreements among parties. And despite protestations to the contrary by former Obama officials, if Iran has remained compliant with the terms of the JCPOA, it’s principally because the Joint Commission permitted exemptions (e.g. on heavy water storage and low-enriched uranium) which weren’t allowed under the original agreement.
Furthermore, the UN’s Procurement Working Group, the mechanism under the deal which Iran is supposed to use to acquire dual-use items, remains opaque. The PWG meets regularly in Vienna, but its deliberations are secret, and the approval process doesn’t allow sufficient time for the group to effectively vet requests. Worse yet, because of the wording of the deal, if the PWG doesn’t respond within the allotted time, transactions can go ahead by default.
There are also reports strongly suggesting that the Russians (with Chinese connivance) have attempted to carve out exemptions and otherwise complicate the PWG’s work in ways that benefit Iran and enrich Russian and Chinese companies. And there is no public information indicating whether any member states have conducted post-sale end use verification checks as required under the deal.
All these issues raise serious questions, and Congress and the public deserve answers.
The Obama administration, faced with a hostile Congress, simply used its executive powers to go around elected representatives to implement the deal. But post-election, with a Republican skeptical of the Iran Deal in the White House, and GOP majorities in both houses of Congress, there is no good reason why the Trump administration should oppose letting a little more sunlight shine on the JCPOA.
Marc C. Johnson is a global security consultant and former CIA Operations Officer. He has worked extensively on and writes regularly about Iran and WMD proliferation issues. Follow him on Twitter at @blogguero
