Over the past few days I’ve had conversations with several people at the government level in Asia about why Kim Jong-un is pursuing an apparent détente with South Korea and the United States. There seems to be a general consensus that Kim’s remarkable volte face comes down to two factors—one external, the other internal.
First, the external: Over the past year, Kim became genuinely spooked that the Trump administration would launch a preemptive strike on his country—something far beyond the mooted “bloody nose” attack on his nuclear facilities, but an actual decapitation strike aimed at his regime. Trump’s loose-but-not-really-loose talk (“fire and fury”) appears to have compelled Kim to change his strategy.
That, plus an event that really frightened Kim: Last fall, the U.S. flew a group of bombers near North Korean airspace—the closest they’ve flown to the DMZ this century. I’ve been told that North Korea’s air defenses did not detect the aircraft until the last moment. This may have frightened Kim, as it suggested his vaunted defenses are not so vaunted after all.
Then there’s that matter of “maximum pressure,” which has seen the Trump administration spearhead unprecedented sanctions on the regime. I’m told they’ve had a real effect—largely thanks to Chinese pressure—hitting both villagers at the market level as well as the elites. Kim needs the markets to function, as he can no longer feed his people: The rations system collapsed years ago. That the sanctions have had such an impact is an amazing indictment of the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” posture, by the way, which essentially held that there was nothing the outside world could do to shift Kim’s behavior.
And now the internal factor: On ascending the throne six years ago, Kim Jong-un embarked on what South Korean intelligence sources described to me as a “reign of terror.” He purged hundreds of elites, and even executed his uncle and assassinated his eldest brother. This was a (unbelievably bloody) process of power consolidation.
Now, I’m told, Kim’s reign of terror is largely over. This suggests he feels secure in his place. And because he no longer fears an imminent coup, the dictator feels secure enough to change policy. Hence his genuinely remarkable change of tone.
None of this suggests that Kim’s version of a southward facing “Sunshine Policy” will last, of course. But we can at least begin to understand why the secretive regime has shifted its public tone so rapidly—and so drastically.
