President Trump has changed his policies in his first 100 days in office more than any president in the post-World War II era—or perhaps any president ever. And for the most part the changes have been for the better.
Trump is no longer a raw populist. He hasn’t become an internationalist but the idea that he’s an isolationist has proved to be untrue. Immigration and trade were two of his biggest campaign issues last year, but his approach to them has changed significantly. His desire to build a wall along the Mexican border is a lonely remnant.
The most dramatic change involves Russia and China. He was expected by the media and foreign policy establishment to befriend Russian president Vladimir Putin and pick fights with China’s Xi Jinping. The opposite has occurred. Trump insists there’s “chemistry” between him and Xi. There’s no evidence of any between him and Putin.
Mainstream reporters and columnists are mostly unimpressed with Trump’s U-turns. They tend to treat them as mere flip-flops—that is, changes that were not well thought out and based largely on instinct or politics, not knowledge or foresight. And Democrats, liberals, and some Republicans view him as unsophisticated and crass.
Why so many changes? Here’s a short list of issues on which Trump has adopted new positions: NATO, currency manipulation by China, the North American Free Trade Agreement, North Korea, torture, intervention in the Syrian civil war, the Export-Import Bank, Wall Street, Federal Reserve chair Janet Yellen.
There’s a central reason for what Doyle McManus of the Los Angeles Times refers to as the president’s “head-spinning policy reversals.” Trump has no ideology, no central idea from which his stances on policy radiate. This makes it easy to change his mind. He’s not violating any cherished principle. He’s unbound. It also makes him unpredictable.
Another reason is Trump’s lack of knowledge as a candidate. His campaign speeches were loaded with applause lines and rarely included facts or explanations. In debates with Republican opponents and later with Hillary Clinton, his statements were mainly assertions.
As president, Trump already knows considerably more than he did on January 20. He’s learned a lot in a short period of time, especially from “his generals,” as he calls them, from Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and from the many foreign leaders with whom he’s held discussions. His economic outlook has been affected by Gary Cohn, his chief economic adviser.
When he met with Xi Jinping, he was lectured for 10 minutes on why China has influence with North Korea but not control. As a result, Trump changed his view of what should be expected from China in the struggle to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.
A final reason for Trump’s changes is his reliance on his advisers. He’s the boss, but they’ve created his new policies. General John Kelly, the homeland security secretary, declared there would be no mass roundups of illegal immigrants. That became policy.
On his own, Trump has softened his view of children brought to the United States by parents who entered illegally. He’s unlikely to backtrack and seek to deport these so-called dreamers. But Kelly has said he might have to separate children from their parents in some cases.
Tillerson, Defense Secretary James Mattis, and National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster have drawn Trump away from his naïve attitude toward Russia and Putin. They’re strong supporters of NATO and now Trump is.
Peter Baker of the New York Times was troubled by Trump’s explanation for the NATO flip. “I said it was obsolete,” Trump said. “It’s no longer obsolete.” But NATO hadn’t changed, Baker wrote, only Trump had. Trump’s assessment changed because he has learned more about NATO. True, he didn’t admit he’d been wrong earlier. So what? He wound up in the right place.
Trump doesn’t always wind up there. He knew a lot about real estate development but far less about the economy when he took office. The tax plan he ran on was associated with a strong dollar. In recent weeks, however, he’s complained the dollar is too strong. That is what Cohn is reported to have advised him.
As a candidate, Trump was a one-man band. But in Washington, allies are essential. House speaker Paul Ryan, once scorned by Trump, is now an ally. When the bill to repeal and replace Obamacare failed in the House, the president didn’t blame Ryan. Rather, he wants to try again with a new bill. For that, he needs Ryan.
He also needs Tillerson, who had gotten the reputation for being over his head at the State Department and ineffective. Then, his status “shifted” after Tillerson took “a lead on the administration’s strategy with Syria, Russia, and China,” Politico‘s Annie Karni wrote. “He’s emerging as Trump’s favorite Cabinet secretary” and “one of Trump’s most frequent White House guests.”
Trump is dependent on Tillerson, Ryan, the generals, Cohn, and a handful of others who are the architects of his new policies. So he isn’t the sole owner of his policies. They are rooted in the experience, skill, and knowledge of his top advisers. Would he spurn their advice and go out on his own as a one-man band again? Would he inform General Mattis he’s decided to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities? I don’t think so.
Part of the old Trump remains. He’s like a talented basketball player, a great scorer, who’s always in foul trouble. He doesn’t play the game as well as he might. But he’s gotten a lot better.
Fred Barnes is an executive editor at The Weekly Standard.
