On the surface, the visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Washington in October was all smiles and warm praise about Islamabad’s close relationship with Washington.
But the problems that make Pakistan America’s most troublesome frenemy continue to loom over the Obama administration’s policy goals, most particularly in the efforts to stem Islamist terrorism and build a stable Afghanistan. Sharif also did not give way on Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal in his Oct. 22 meeting with President Obama, insisting it was still needed to deter India, Pakistan’s nuclear-armed neighbor and chief rival.
“By inviting Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the White House, President Obama may only have wanted to signal America’s continued interest in the nuclear-armed country. But in Pakistan, it reignited the belief that Uncle Sam simply cannot manage the world without Pakistan’s help,” Husain Haqqani, a former Pakistani ambassador to Washington who’s now a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, wrote in an analysis of the visit for India’s The Hindu newspaper.
“American readiness to offer aid has bred dependence and hubris. The U.S. has ended up as an enabler of Pakistan’s dysfunction by reinforcing the belief of its elite that it is too important to fail or be neglected,” he added. “Instead of telling Pakistan’s elite how important they are, it might be more useful to stop footing the bill for Pakistan’s failings.”
The United States is Pakistan’s largest trading partner and also its principal aid donor, sending $5 billion since 2009 in economic assistance and an additional $1 billion a year in security funds.
Pakistan became one of the largest foreign recipients of U.S. aid after the 9/11 attacks, as Washington quickly recognized that its cooperation was essential to ridding Afghanistan of both the Taliban and the Islamist jihadis who had congregated there behind al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, mastermind of the attacks.
But Islamabad has been playing a double game for years, simultaneously supporting extremists and fighting them, depending on where its interests lie at the time. Support from safe havens in Pakistan, and from elements inside the Pakistani government such as the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence, has kept the Taliban in the fight since U.S. troops ejected them from power in 2001.
Relations with Washington have improved greatly since that contradiction blew up in the face of both countries when U.S. Navy SEALs killed bin Laden in a May 2, 2011, raid in Abbottabad, a military garrison town just 35 miles from Islamabad. In the aftermath of the raid, it was revealed that bin Laden had been hiding there for years, and repercussions over how much, and whether, Pakistani officials were aware of his presence sent the alliance between the two countries spiraling to its lowest level since the Sept. 11 attacks.
In a speech at the U.S. Institute of Peace the day after his meeting with Obama, Sharif discussed the success of a massive counterterrorism operation launched in the wake of a Dec. 16, 2014, attack on an army-run school in Peshawar that killed 145 people. The attack by the Pakistani branch of the Taliban was seen as a stark reminder of the danger of Islamabad’s policy of sheltering what it considered “good” terrorists while only going after the “bad” ones.
“We made a strategic choice to eliminate all terrorist groups,” Sharif said, adding that “we have done it in our own national interest, not at the behest of others.”
Saying his government has “turned the tide against terrorists in Pakistan,” Sharif noted that “the past year has seen the lowest number of terrorist attacks and suicide bombings since 2007.”
But Pakistan continues to shelter the Afghan branch of the Taliban, which U.S. officials have long noted is one of the main obstacles to building a stable, peaceful Afghan society and allowing foreign troops to leave. Kabul’s concerns over that support are complicating efforts to restart peace talks, which were stalled amid a power struggle in the Taliban following confirmation in late July that longtime leader Mullah Muhammad Omar had died in Pakistan in 2013.
In a readout of the Oct. 22 meeting with Sharif, the White House noted that Obama had “highlighted the importance of Pakistan undertaking effective action against terrorists that seek to undermine peaceful dialogue and destabilize the region.”
Later, White House spokesman Eric Schultz alluded to Islamabad’s past habit of simultaneously sheltering and combating terrorist groups, saying, “One piece that was important to the president is that Pakistan not discriminate against terrorist groups. That’s something that we’ve made clear in the past and was reiterated yesterday in the bilateral meeting.”
But in his speech, Sharif said Islamabad’s good relations with the Afghan Taliban were in the interests of brokering a peaceful transition in Afghanistan.
“We cannot bring them to the table and be asked to kill them at the same time,” he said.
Meanwhile, the administration has struggled to balance its relations with Pakistan and those with India, which continues to be the main target of Islamabad’s hostility. The two countries have fought four wars and many other skirmishes and border conflicts since both became independent in 1947, and that history is at the heart of unsuccessful U.S. efforts to at least curb the growth of their nuclear arsenals.
According to an Oct. 22 report by the Federation of American Scientists, Pakistan has 110-130 nuclear warheads and is on track to increase its stockpile to up to 250 warheads in a decade. This growth has coincided with the development of new, longer-range missiles and low-yield tactical nuclear weapons that will further increase the country’s nuclear capabilities.
Pakistani officials have made clear that India is the target of that expansion.
In his speech at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Sharif said India’s “dangerous military doctrines … will compel Pakistan to take several countermeasures to preserve credible deterrence.”
