In a lopsided 7-2 opinion written by conservative Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court ruled yesterday that federal voter registration law prevented Arizona from requiring people to submit proof of citizenship when they register to vote using standardized federal forms.
The decision is markedly less controversial or influential than the media and partisans on both sides made it out to be.
Although hot button issues like voter ID and voter fraud are peripheral in case, the Court’s opinion (intentionally) didn’t address those matters. The only issue before the Court was whether the federal “motor voter” registration law, which provides for a simplistic voter registration form, could be altered by Arizona to also require proof of citizenship.
That question was apparently a pretty easy call for the Justices. Because the Elections Clause of Article I of the Constitution explicitly gives Congress the authority to make election laws, the Court bluntly ruled that the federal law precludes Arizona from making independent alterations to the form.
The reasoning of the decision was actually similar to that of the 2012 case Arizona v. United States, which overturned three of Arizona’s controversial immigration laws. In that instance, however, Arizona was simply attempting to enforce already-existing federal immigration laws that were being ignored by the Obama administration.
Despite the media attention received by the case, the ruling clearly isn’t a vast, liberal voting rights victory. For starters, Arizona is still free to impose its own requirements on its state-produced voter registration forms, which more than 95 percent of people in Arizona use to register. That means that the vast majority of Arizona voters will have to continue to prove their citizenship prior to being added to the state’s voter rolls.
The Justices also basically handed Arizona a step-by-step guide in the final pages of the opinion illustrating how the state could get its way by pursuing other legal means within the current federal law. For example, Arizona might “assert . . . that it would be arbitrary for the [federal Election Assistance Commission] to refuse to include Arizona’s instruction when it has accepted a similar instruction requested by Louisiana,” hinted Scalia.
At the end of the day, the Court was wise in avoiding the liberal instinct to interpret Constitutional provisions so as to support their favored policy outcome. Unfortunately, good Supreme Court jurisprudence must occasionally overrule good policy.
