Romania confirmed that roughly 1,000 U.S. troops who rotated out of the country will not be replaced. The Romanian Defense Ministry called the move expected “given changes in Washington’s priorities.” The Pentagon insisted this is not “an American withdrawal from Europe or a signal of lessened commitment to NATO.”
Washington, D.C.’s, troop cuts on NATO’s eastern flank have alarmed allies and U.S. officials alike. Top Republican lawmakers on the Armed Services Committee have openly opposed the move. They’re right to be concerned. Even if the change involves a small number of troops, it signals disengagement, which weakens America’s power projection.
This comes after Lithuania’s Defense Ministry last month said the United States informed Baltic governments that funding for military assistance under Section 333, which provides training and equipment to partner forces, is expected to fall to zero next year. In 2024 and 2025, Congress allocated over $450 million through the Baltic Security Initiative to strengthen the defenses of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The final decision is still being discussed in Washington, D.C., as part of broader budget talks, but the report has reinforced the sense that America may be stepping back from Europe’s front line.
President Donald Trump argued that European nations must shoulder more responsibility for their own defense as Washington, D.C., shifts focus toward the Indo-Pacific. That argument is valid: Europe’s richest states have long underinvested in defense and relied heavily on American power to guarantee their security. But the Trump administration should not throw the baby out with the bathwater.
These cuts fall hardest on the allies that have done the most to meet U.S. expectations. Romania and the Baltic states consistently meet or exceed NATO’s defense spending targets and have been among Washington, D.C.’s, strongest international supporters. They are not the problem. The real burden-sharing gap lies with Western Europe, with Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The defense commitments of these nations remain modest and politically constrained by welfare spending. Meanwhile, Slovakia and Hungary echo Kremlin talking points while still benefiting from NATO protection. If Washington, D.C., wants to recalibrate its commitments, it should start there. If anything, Washington, D.C., should be deepening its support for the countries that have stood unwaveringly on its side.
A U.S. retreat will have consequences far beyond Europe, especially in Beijing, where it would be read as proof of waning American influence. Logic is following: if the U.S. cannot project strength in Europe, it will struggle to command it in the Indo-Pacific. Weakness in one theater invites testing in another.
History offers a warning. When former President Barack Obama effectively left Eastern and Central European allies on their own, reduced American engagement, and scrapped missile-defense plans in Poland, ironically on the anniversary of a Soviet invasion, it was seen across the region as a sign of retreat. That perception encouraged leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán to seek alignment elsewhere and emboldened Russia, paving the way for its 2014 invasion of Ukraine.
101ST AIR ASSAULT DIVISION WITHDRAWAL FROM ROMANIA DOESN’T WEAKEN NATO
Over the past three decades, the presence of U.S. troops in Europe has dropped from about 350,000 during the Cold War to roughly 100,000 today. If Trump’s goal is to end the war in Ukraine, cutting down U.S. commitment to NATO’s eastern flank allies would work against it. Peace will only come through the same formula that ended the Cold War: sustained American power and posture. Reducing American troops and commitments while a war rages on Europe’s borders would undermine that posture.
When American commitment looks uncertain in Europe, it will invite new challenges elsewhere, including from China, which is watching closely for signs that Washington, D.C.’s, will is fading.
