The Pentagon’s vital acquisition reforms

The Pentagon’s acquisition process is broken. But a series of possible reforms promises to fix decades of waste and mismanagement, at least somewhat. With a potential conflict with China in the offing, there’s no time to waste.

When it comes to procuring weapons systems, reform is not only necessary, it’s vital. The F-35 fighter jet is perhaps the most infamous example. The program was launched in 1996 but didn’t go operational until 2015-2019. And even then, “it flew with unresolved software problems … and many inadequacies remained to be corrected,” as defense analysts Edward Luttwak and Eitan Shamir noted.

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Meanwhile, the United States is looking at the very real possibility of war with China, a country with vast economic and military power. Suffice to say: In the event of a conflict, America won’t have 20 years to field weapons systems. As the late Gen. Douglas MacArthur famously warned, “The history of failure in war can almost be summed up in two words: Too late. Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy. Too late in realizing the mortal danger. Too late in preparedness.” This is the crisis that the administration seeks to avert.

According to reports by Politico and Breaking Defense, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth intends to tackle the Pentagon’s acquisition issues head-on. The plan, which hasn’t been made public, is titled “Transforming the Warfighting Acquisition System to Accelerate Fielding of Capabilities.” 

Todd Harrison, a budget and acquisition expert with the American Enterprise Institute, said that the reforms will be transformative — and risky. He told Breaking Defense that there’s always a trade-off between “cost, schedule and performance” and what Hegseth is saying is “of those three, I want to prioritize speed.” And this, the analyst warns, might require “making sacrifices in one or both of the others.” 

Change itself is risky. But sometimes the situation is so dire that assuming a greater level of risk is itself a less dangerous proposition. And that is where things stand today vis-à-vis deterring, and if need be, winning a war with China. Indeed, there is something to be said for emphasizing speed. History tells us that it can be crucial.

During World War II, America’s last major great power war, the Allied Powers defeated their Axis foes for a variety of reasons. But America’s industrial might — particularly its ability to develop and field weapons and munitions quickly — was key. Importantly, the U.S., Great Britain, and the Soviet Union didn’t always produce better weapons than their opponents, but they did provide more of them, and they proved better at replenishing them over a longer duration. Quantity can have a quality all its own. 

In 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called for 45,000 aircraft and 45,00 tanks to be made within a year. By 1945, the U.S. was producing more than double that, a feat that wouldn’t have been possible without waging a war on red tape, as well. 

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The ability to produce and repair platforms quickly can also matter. For example, U.S. aircraft carriers were essential to victory. Unlike many of their Japanese counterparts, their decks were made out of wood instead of steel. While seemingly an inferior material, the wood proved easier to build and replace, ensuring that more were operable. The U.S. also had to push to accelerate the production of the landing craft that made D-Day happen.

Such success was only made possible by a sense of urgency, intervention, and fresh thinking — all of which are desperately needed now.

Sean Durns is a Washington, D.C.-based foreign affairs analyst. His views are his own.

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