A Latin American military strongman ignores the results of two democratic elections and usurps power. He jails and brutalizes the opposition and goes into business with drug cartels. The U.S. indicts him for drug trafficking and money laundering. A president prone to negotiation before using force fails to persuade him to relinquish power in exchange for dropping the charges. A gradual American military buildup follows. When the dictator refuses to cede, a sudden and massive U.S. invasion topples him.
This is how President George H. W. Bush removed Panama’s General Manuel Noriega from power 35 years ago. The lessons of Operation Just Cause apply today to Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro. There are similarities and dissimilarities.
Like Noriega, Maduro has twice ignored the results of democratic elections and clung to power. Also like Noriega, who was indicted for drug trafficking and money laundering during Ronald Reagan’s presidency, Maduro has been formally charged with drug trafficking and narco-terrorism. He can be brought to trial in the U.S. But there are significant differences between the 1989 invasion of Panama and what would be entailed by an invasion of Venezuela today.
First and foremost is knowledge of the terrain and targets. America controlled the Panama Canal until 1999, giving us detailed knowledge of Panama’s armed forces and vital installations. The U.S. military had trained in the country since the early 1900s, and Fort Sherman was a jungle warfare training center for half a century. Our in-depth understanding of the country’s military targets, doctrines, and leadership made possible the swift collapse of Panama’s armed forces and immediate installation of the duly elected civilian president Guillermo Endara. The objectives of Army General Maxwell Thurman, then head of SOUTHCOM, extended beyond a quick capitulation. Thurman wanted to seize vital assets and personnel who otherwise might escape the initial U.S. assault and form an insurgency.
America lacks equivalent knowledge of Venezuela’s targets.
Our intelligence on Venezuela has vastly improved since the CIA began reopening bases around the country at the time of Operation Just Cause. But without boots on the ground like we had in Panama, an in-depth knowledge of Venezuela’s military leaders and installations is lacking. Moreover, conditions for an insurgency are ripe. Maduro has already established a working relationship with FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), a Marxist guerrilla force that mounted a prolonged insurgency in neighboring Colombia. Venezuela has its own home-grown guerrilla equivalent, the National Liberation Army, which operates with Maduro’s sanction. Both are funded by drug cartels. No doubt Maduro and his guerrilla allies have the foresight to have already established stay-behind redoubts and provisions for waging an insurgency against a successor Venezuelan government.
Maduro also has a friendly neighbor with whom to make common cause. Colombia’s president Gustavo Petro, a former guerrilla, has been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department for failing to curb drug trafficking. In September, he encouraged U.S. troops to disobey orders and effectively mutiny against President Donald Trump. Recently, he’s been organizing opposition among Latin American leaders to U.S. destruction of cartel drug shipments. He wants them to cut off cooperation with U.S. intelligence. Meanwhile, Colombia’s cocaine production is soaring.
Narco-terrorist states are on the rise in Latin America today, reversing hard-won progress against the cartels in earlier decades. A 2024 study by the Institute for International Strategic Studies documented the increasing militarization and transnational nature of the threat. Colombia is backpedaling, and Ecuador has become an open battleground between cartels vying for new territory.
When we see video of cartel speedboats being sunk by Hellfire missiles on the nightly news, we are witnessing the opening battle against Latin America’s narco-states. This war is of critical importance to the region’s future. At stake is the stability of the hemisphere and America’s national security.
Trump is right to try to negotiate with Maduro. Don’t be surprised if Trump’s first moves are Israeli-style precision strikes against the leaders of Cartel of the Suns, the drug ring tied to Maduro. A clear demonstration of the accuracy of American firepower and resolve may convince Maduro his best option is giving up power and going into exile. But if it’s necessary to escalate militarily, Trump is unlikely to have the benefit of Noriega’s mistake. In the weeks before President Bush greenlighted Operation Just Cause, Panama rashly declared war on the U.S. This gave Bush all the rationale he needed for the use of force.
No matter how sound the justification for military action against drug cartels, Trump will still have to contend with congressional opposition to using force against Venezuela’s military. He also needs to be ready for a long-term commitment to Venezuela’s security.
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There may yet be a peaceful transition in Venezuela if Maduro ponders the consequences of losing a fight with America. Noriega was captured and sentenced to forty years in a U.S, prison for drug trafficking. Subsequently tried for murder, he spent most of the rest of his life behind bars in France and Panama. In 2017, he was briefly released to be treated for brain cancer and died three months later.
Maduro’s fate could be the same.
John B. Roberts II was an international political strategist who worked extensively in Central and South America. He was born in Panama and was in the country during the early months of Noriega’s ascent to power and shortly before Operation Just Cause. His website is www.jbrobertsauthor.com
