The Biden administration is doing the right thing by assisting Ukraine in locating Russian military command-and-control units. However, the administration’s denial that it is helping Ukraine target Russian general officers does not stand up to scrutiny.
As the New York Times reports, U.S. intelligence-sharing with Ukraine has been crucial to the latter’s ability to identify and eliminate Russian commanders. U.S. officials, however, appear concerned that these revelations will provoke Russian escalation.
A National Security Council spokeswoman told Politico that “the headline of [the New York Times’s] story is misleading and the way it is framed is irresponsible. The [United States] provides battlefield intelligence to help the Ukrainians defend their country. We do not provide intelligence with the intent to kill Russian generals.” NBC News reports that U.S. rules mean it “can share [intelligence] about command and control, but not individuals.”
The administration is stretching here.
After all, “battlefield intelligence” and the sharing of intelligence on Russia “command and control” means identifying particular command units. And that includes general officers who are deployed to Ukraine in order to motivate demoralized units and maintain an offensive initiative. The U.S. pretense that it is not helping Ukraine target general officers is the equivalent of a doctor giving an infected patient antibiotics but insisting that the antibiotics aren’t necessarily intended to fight the patient’s infection. The U.S. is helping Ukraine with satellite, electronic warfare, and cyber capabilities, all of which allow Ukraine to trace the origin of an order, movement, or action. This is the definition of command-and-control targeting.
Top line: The Russians won’t buy these excuses, and the U.S. shouldn’t care regardless.
Russia has invaded a sovereign democracy and waged a brutal war on its people. The U.S. is right to support Ukraine and right to help it target those preeminently responsible for the conduct of the war against it. In contrast to what the Russians do to U.S. government personnel, the U.S. is not targeting Russian officials beyond Ukraine. This effort is occurring on Ukrainian soil. In turn, if the Russians don’t like it, they need only leave Ukraine. Indeed, the Russians might consider thanking the Biden administration for tempering British efforts to help Ukraine conduct a more aggressive campaign.
The morality of this targeting action is hardly questionable. Ukraine’s attacks slow Russia’s decision-making and undermine its logistics efforts. In essence, Russia’s commanders are its battlefield brain. As Ukraine targets forward command units, it thus severs the connections of front-line units to their evolving orders, support elements, and broader battlefield awareness. This encourages operational lethargy. It makes it less likely that Russian forces will seize more territory and commit more Bucha-style massacres.
Instead of worrying whether they are upsetting Russia too much, Biden administration officials should ask themselves whether they are helping Ukraine too little and too slowly. What happens in this conflict holds profound implications for international security and democracy in the 21st century. The U.S. owns the escalation curve on Russia. Team Biden just needs to remember it.
