The Biden administration’s request for an additional $33 billion from Congress for additional security, military, and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine was welcome news. It marked a U.S. policy shift from deterrence to seeing “Russia weakened.” British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has similarly announced an additional $375 million in military aid to Ukraine. This investment in Ukraine’s security is essential to its morale and survival, but is it enough?
Russian President Vladimir Putin may formally declare war on Ukraine as soon as May 9, “Victory Day” in Russia. This date commemorates the Nazi defeat in 1945. But a declaration of war would allow Putin to mobilize reserve forces and draft conscripts, which Russia needs amid a growing manpower shortage. Of the estimated 190,000 Russian soldiers that have participated in the invasion of Ukraine, approximately 25% have been killed or wounded.
That said, Ukraine has suffered its own losses.
Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovych has admitted that Ukraine has suffered “serious losses” in battles in the east. Can Ukraine continue to incur these losses? The United States estimates that as many as 3,000 Ukrainians have been killed in action and another 10,000 wounded. In a war of attrition, Russia wins, no matter how much money or the number of weapons we provide them. When Ukraine exhausts its manpower and combat experience, then what?
It’s unclear.
Still, according to Ukrainian intelligence services, Russia wants to conclude the war in Ukraine within four months. It has set September as the deadline. No matter how gallant Ukraine’s resistance, a Russian conventional escalation could overwhelm its defenses. To draw an analogy from our own history, Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee, in the latter days of the American Civil War, soundly defeated Gen. Ulysses S. Grant at Cold Harbor but could not replace his losses and eventually succumbed to Grant. Grant, on the other hand, was able to replace his losses and pressed forward to Appomattox.
Putin believes he has found his Grant in Gen. Aleksandr Dvornikov. Russian losses are irrelevant, despite what he has told his countrymen and Russian mothers. According to a Jamestown Foundation report, in a throwback to Stalinist-era practices, Russian forces in Ukraine may have begun using “barrier troops” — a term originating in World War II for so-called anti-retreat forces. In this case, forces loyal to Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov have been used to “encourage” conscripts and mercenaries not to retreat. Russia has also reportedly resumed the use of penal military units (shtrafniki) — former criminals, deserters, or purged former military personnel who are given a chance “to redeem their crimes against the Motherland by blood.”
Dvornikov’s strategy is to attack the Ukrainian military along an extended front, from Sumy to Kherson, stretching out its defenses. The main effort remains in the Donbas region and on securing the absolute surrender of Ukrainian holdouts in Mariupol. The same tactics apply in each case, though: artillery bombardments and airstrikes followed by frontal assaults. The same results, too: slow progress against an entrenched enemy, with high casualty rates. The intent is to wear Ukraine down with relentless pressure. Russia may then rely upon the mobilization of reserve forces and conscripts to overrun Ukraine’s defenses.
Ukraine is unlikely to be able to maintain its current operational tempo. The Russians have mass and numbers and can afford to take more casualties. Ukrainian forces are fighting daily, either repelling armor advances or sheltering from artillery barrages and airstrikes. On Day 70 of the invasion, they are mentally and physically exhausted. Getting weapons, munitions, and logistics to their forward positions is becoming increasingly difficult.
The question: How long can the Ukrainian military continue at this pace? September is just four short months away.
