The world’s eyes remain fixed on the Russia-Ukraine border, where approximately 100,000 Russian forces remain stationed amid escalating threats by Russian officials.
More than 4,200 miles to the east, however, there’s another international story that refuses to go away: North Korea’s missile program.
Pyongyang has been busy refining and testing its growing array of ballistic, cruise, and possibly hypersonic missiles. Whereas North Korea held fire for about six months in 2021, it has launched three missile tests in the first two weeks of 2022. The latest occurred Jan. 14, involving two short-range ballistic missiles.
The United States has responded to all of this activity with the usual outrage. Indeed, the troubles with North Korea resemble one long bad movie on repeat, where the plot is entirely predictable and the characters are the same. The trend goes something like this: North Korea tests a missile of a certain type, prompting an immediate verbal reaction from South Korea and Japan. Seoul schedules an emergency meeting to discuss the launch and releases a statement expressing its “strong regret” at the North’s actions. U.S. weapons analysts get to work assessing the exact capacity and capability of the missile that was just fired. The U.S. State Department issues a condemnation, reminding everybody about how the launch was a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. The U.S. Secretary of State gets on the phone with his South Korean and Japanese colleagues, reassuring them (for the umpteenth time) that their country’s alliances with the U.S. are ironclad.
A few days, weeks, or months later, the entire cycle starts up again.
The general assessments of each launch are typically preprogrammed as well. The main conclusions tend to follow two paths: 1. Kim Jong Un is a child who wants attention from the world’s superpower, or 2. Kim Jong Un is trying to accumulate more leverage in the event that negotiations with the U.S. recommence.
The first suggestion is a narcissistic interpretation of global affairs in which the U.S. is at the center of the universe. The second only makes sense if North Korea is interested in beginning negotiations. Judging by Kim’s recent comments, the North Korean leader is far more interested in bolstering food production than diving back into talks with Washington. Secretary of State Antony Blinken appears to subscribe to the first explanation. “I think some of this is … North Korea trying to get attention,” he told MSNBC on Thursday.
Yet there’s another option that isn’t being considered, namely that Kim Jong Un is doing precisely what he promised to do a year earlier when he laid out a proclamation to his military officers, scientists, and weapons engineers. To simplify it: Diversify the North’s weapons systems and build more of them. Kim even outlined the systems his engineers should prioritize, including multiple-warhead missiles, new models of ballistic missiles, “hypersonic gliding flight warheads,” cyber weapons, and drones. Despite a coronavirus pandemic that entailed a shutdown of its border with China, the Kim dynasty still used the preceding year to implement Kim’s order, testing short-range ballistic missiles in March, a long-range cruise missile in September, and a submarine-launched ballistic missile in October.
Viewed through this prism, the launches look like a relatively ordinary occurrence, that of a bureaucracy implementing explicit policy guidance given from the top. It’s less about desperately pleading for Washington’s attention and more about carrying out what the leader expects.
Why does any of this matter?
The U.S. can’t craft a North Korea policy that works, a policy that relies more on deterrence and pragmatic communication instead of some denuclearization fantasy, if it can’t even read North Korea properly.
Daniel DePetris (@DanDePetris) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. His opinions are his own.
