One year ago in the Confederations Cup, U.S. head coach Bob Bradley cycled through every possible wrong lineup he could find. Whether it was trying Landon Donovan at forward, Sacha Kljestan in the midfield, leaving Jonathan Spector out in favor of Jonathan Bornstein or putting DaMarcus Beasley on the field at all, Bradley only seemed to get to the right combination through a fortuitous process of elimination thanks to yellow cards, complete howlers, and the health of Carlos Bocanegra. Bradley, thankfully, was lucky that he got it right by the time the U.S. played Spain – and when it was right, it took U.S. soccer to new heights with an earth-shattering upset of Spain and a nearly cataclysmic upset of Brazil.
Instead of using that experience as a springboard when it came to the return trip to South Africa for the 2010 World Cup, Bradley made the same mistakes again, ignoring mountains of evidence before and during the tournament that pointed to combinations of players that he never recognized when it came to fielding a starting eleven.
It’s remarkable that in a sport like soccer, where so much of the action within a game has little to do with coaching, that a coach’s choices before the match can have such a dramatic impact.
I said this after the Algeria game: no team ever goes into a game planning to make tactical substitutions at halftime. Bradley made that type of change in every U.S. match in the 2010 World Cup – and the trend continued like clockwork against Ghana. He might as well have been on the field himself for every early goal scored against his team, including the two earliest of the tournament (`4 Steven Gerrard, `5 Kevin Prince Boateng).
Ricardo Clark played an enormous role in both of those goals. Whether it was Bob Bradley selecting him as a starter, or Michael Bradley telling his father who he preferred as a midfield partner, Clark’s inclusion in the starting lineup was a massive mistake – and that was clear against England two weeks ago. A 31st minute substitute?? In the soccer world, that’s far more embarrassing for the coach than for the player. Every starting 11 that the U.S. trotted out found itself in trouble. For four matches, the heart and determination of its core was able to overcome those missteps. But by the time overtime came against Ghana, the tank was empty. Oguchi Onyewu – was he healthy enough even come to South Africa? – might not have caught up to Asamoah Gyan either.
But the biggest questions have to do with central midfield and forward. It was nearly unanimous among the coaches that I spoke to that coming out of the U.S. training camp, Maurice Edu was the best option to start alongside Bradley, due to his combination of speed, range, toughness, passing and composure on the ball. José Torres, given the way he played against Turkey (when he replaced an ineffective Clark), was the second option. Universally, those I spoke to saw Clark as a yellow card and a giveaway waiting to happen. Done and done. Why was that so hard for Bradley to recognize?
Speaking of the Turkey match, how in the world did one 45-minute spell for Robbie Findley turn him into the second-best forward in the country? Surely, his speed alone isn’t why he started three out of four matches in South Africa. Perhaps that is what Donovan referred to when he talked after the Ghana match about being “naïve.” Quality on the ball – especially finishing – is how to win at the World Cup level. For the U.S. camp to think for one moment that it possesses some supposed superior athleticism is almost as insulting as the European coaches falling back on that argument simply because they don’t know who the U.S. players are.
Meanwhile, Edson Buddle should be the most frustrated player on the U.S. roster. Not only did Buddle join the U.S. team as the perfect complementary club teammate of Donovan’s, a product of Bruce Arena (and thus a similar system to Bradley’s) and the hottest striker in Major League Soccer, all he did for the U.S. coach was show that he could score. The reward – not a single start. Instead, when Bradley didn’t have Findley, he opted for Herculez Gomez despite Gomez having oodles of success a super-sub. For the U.S., Bradley turned Gomez turned into a halftime sub. Buddle could only watch against Ghana since Bradley burned his other sub replacing Clark with Edu.
Benny Feilhaber will go down as the second-most frustrated U.S. player. The ultimate ‘tweener, he always changed the U.S. outlook as soon as he stepped on the field but because of his unique qualities, but somehow he could never find his way into a lineup where Donovan, Clint Dempsey and Michael Bradley were always inked as starters. Perhaps Bob Bradley should’ve worked that out before or during training camp?
The U.S. exit on Saturday still doesn’t feel as tortured as it was four years ago, when the team bowed out meekly and uninspired. They did win Group C, after all. But given the undeniable golden opportunity to reach at least the semifinals in South Africa, the 2010 performance may go down as far more disappointing. The quality, heart, and for the most part, chemistry, were all there, but Bob Bradley never figured out how to get his squad out of the parking lot without backing over the tire spikes.
