No, Russia hasn’t blinked — and why a Wednesday invasion is unlikely

Be cautious of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s newly conciliatory rhetoric. Putin is almost certainly attempting to buffer struggling Russian stock markets and keep the West off balance. The top line: Russia remains highly likely to launch a major offensive war against Ukraine.

Still, there’s no doubt that Putin’s rhetoric was noticeably more conciliatory on Monday. Meeting with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Putin approved Lavrov’s request to continue negotiations with the United States and NATO. This has raised hopes that a peaceful compromise might be agreed and that Ukraine would thus be able to avoid Russian invasion.

Unfortunately, it is folly to take Putin’s language as a cause for hope.

Instead, the publicly staged airing of Putin’s negotiation grant seems designed to buffer the Russian stock markets and inflation-wracked economy. Russian markets have been hit hard by investor fears that the West might introduce crippling sanctions in the event Russian forces attack Ukraine. Amid high inflation rates, Putin has reason to protect the economy for as long as possible.

What comes next?

Well, we shouldn’t assume that a new Russian invasion of Ukraine will automatically begin on Wednesday, as suggested by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The Russian military values deception as a foremost concern. So also does Putin himself. To attack on a specific date would sacrifice the element of surprise, unnecessarily endangering Russian forces and their objectives. At a personal level as much as political, Putin would also be highly reticent of giving the U.S. intelligence community a win in the form of its accurate predicting of his invasion date. Far more likely is a near-term Russian staged provocation designed to blame Ukraine for an attack on Russian interests.

The available evidence, including from Russia’s own security services, suggests that provocation plots underway are both numerous and diverse. An assassination or destructive strike upon a high-profile pro-Russian figure or target is highly plausible. Recall, after all, the Moscow apartment bombings of September 1999. While blamed on Chechen terrorists, there is significant if circumstantial evidence to suggest that pro-Putin elements conducted the attacks in order to provide a pretext for war in Chechnya.

Contrary to Putin’s calmer rhetoric, the same strategy is likely to be applied against Ukraine. War remains highly likely.

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