Fighting his own people as they peacefully reject his election theft, Alexander Lukashenko is relying on Russia to retain power. That gives Vladimir Putin great leverage with which to make the Belarusian dictator a de facto puppet.
In turn, NATO must make clear to Lukashenko and the Belorussian government at large that they will be viewed as a military adjunct of the Russian Federation in the event of a relevant conflict on the European continent. The need for such a declaration arises alongside the possibility that Putin would use Belarus as a launch point for future military action against the Baltic states or Poland. While the likelihood of such an invasion remains low, it’s no small concern. Were Russian combined arms forces to establish a forward presence in Belarus, they could strike west and north simultaneously, pinning the Baltics between Belarus, the Russian garrison province at Kaliningrad, and Russia proper.
A basic diagram as to why Russia incorporating Belarus – Putin’s ultimate objective – would be problematic for NATO. Alongside Kaliningrad fortress, would allow compression of Poland, and near total geographic isolation of Baltics. pic.twitter.com/7HDqMULNVw
— Tom Rogan (@TomRtweets) August 17, 2020
Beyond this basic geographic point, as the Wall Street Journal notes, there are particular geographic concerns that pose challenges to NATO war planning. The United States and its NATO allies must clarify the situation for Lukashenko.
Most importantly, Lukashenko must be educated to the understanding that his territory cannot simply serve as a Russian frontier outpost. Absent that assessment, Lukashenko will have uncontested amenability to Putin’s use of Belarus as a launchpad for conventional or provocation-based operations against NATO. Instead, Lukashenko must know that he would be held mutually responsible for any Russian aggression.
The critical concern here is that of a conventional attack. But it’s not just about geography. Russia has spent the past decade developing a competent battle strategy with which to seize NATO territory and then deter NATO counteroffensives and ultimately, split the alliance. This war plan relies on high-speed offensives and the rapid establishment of potent air defense, electronic warfare, and artillery-missile strongholds that would allow the Russians to inflict heavy losses on any forces seeking to displace them. While NATO has trained to defeat these strongholds, those efforts are far from assured.
Moreover, there’s a political factor that Putin also prioritizes here: his ability to seize territory and then quickly offer a ceasefire on his terms. Forcing NATO member states to choose between continued bloody fighting and a relative peace, Putin is confident he could sever the alliance between the U.S., Britain, and Poland on one hand and less resolute governments such as Germany, Austria, Italy, and Spain on the other. The key for NATO is, thus, to deter any attack and defeat it in short order.
If Lukashenko knows that his new station as Putin’s footrest will carry the risk of his own demise and potentially that of his nation per se, he may resist the harder edges of Putin’s new influence. It is in NATO’s interest that he do so. The alliance must make clear that Lukashenko won’t get a free pass in the event of conflict.
