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As the war in Iran rumbles on, it’s becoming clear that China‘s hand has been strengthened.
This war has drained U.S. military readiness, especially for the Navy, while depleting munitions that would be crucial in any war with China. It has undermined U.S. relations with allies outside of Israel and, at the margin, boosted China’s otherwise poisoned pledge of foreign policy predictability in contrast to U.S. unpredictability. It has also caused China to immediately ramp up its energy production and find alternative supply routes.
Worst of all, the war has suggested to Chinese President Xi Jinping that the way to defeat President Donald Trump is to find an economic pressure point, hit it hard, and threaten greater economic pain if Trump doesn’t yield.
In return for these costs, the war has thus far achieved only temporary strategic victories in degrading but not destroying Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. While the ledger might move toward a net loss for China were the Iranian regime removed from power, that prospect appears very unlikely unless Trump is willing to send troops into sustained operations on mainland Iran, a politically toxic prospect. Similarly, those who say the United States can simply keep bombing Iran into perpetuity ignore the fact that while the ultimate outcome of Iranian state collapse would be acceptable to Israel, it would cause major problems for the U.S.
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The heavy expenditure of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, standard missile-class, and Patriot block air defense interceptors in this war is particularly concerning. Shortages in skilled labor, spare parts, and factory space mean that the U.S. will almost certainly lack even a minimally China-war-adequate supply of interceptor munitions until 2029. But Xi, now supremely powerful over the Chinese military, has instructed it to be ready to invade Taiwan by next year. As I noted prior to the war, “Those calling for regime-change action too casually minimize these trade-offs.”
The Chinese military has also benefited from the U.S. military’s diversion in the Middle East. At a minimum, this allows China to operate with more freedom of action and increase military pressure on U.S. treaty defense allies such as Japan and the Philippines. Those allies know it. The redeployment of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit from the Pacific to the Middle East serves as just one example here. Additionally, because the war has forced long deployment extensions for crews and ships, already delayed maintenance schedules will worsen. The exhaustion of the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier and its crew illustrates the sacrifice of future readiness at the expense of current operations.
Yes, you build a military to use it. But you must use it in a way that balances against your priority threat concerns. And judged by U.S. interests, “Iran is a nest of pests that must be contained and, when necessary, stamped out. Communist China is a den of apex predators that requires unceasing, absolute priority attention.” The U.S. can no longer give China that priority attention. We must hope Xi’s paranoia over losing a war to take Taiwan will continue to triumph over his salivating ambition to conquer the island democracy.
This war has also cost the U.S. diplomatically. It has significantly increased energy costs around the world, creating pressure on democratic governments with their frustrated populations. While European governments absolutely should have provided military support to open the Strait of Hormuz energy chokepoint, the point stands that this was a war of choice that has created hardship for many allies.
Trump’s associated problem is that if he now extracts the U.S. from this war in a manner that suggests an Iranian victory, he risks alienating even the Sunni Arab monarchies that have fallen under Iranian missile and drone attacks. That would indirectly boost China’s diplomatic strategy in the Middle East. After all, while China is a neutral partner in Middle Eastern conflicts, it also offers a predictability that the Sunni Arab monarchies find comfortable and worthy of close engagement. We want those monarchies dealing with America and listening to America, first, not Xi.
Then there’s the energy factor.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has had a painful but limited effect on China. But Beijing has diversified its energy imports and tapped its strategic reserve to sustain its economy at near-prewar operating levels and GDP. China will now further boost its domestic energy output and land-based supply routes that are less vulnerable to being choked off by the U.S. or its allies in a future Taiwan war. In such a war, however, Xi would do just about whatever he needed to win. If the Chinese Communist Party had to ration energy supplies, it would do so. Remember, Xi is an autocrat who does not need popular consent. And Xi views the conquest of Taiwan as the crucial test of his and the CCP’s destiny.
What about those who suggest that, assuming an eventual U.S. victory in the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. could leverage future control of the strait to cut off China from energy supplies?
I disagree with their hypothesis. The Sunni Arab monarchies might support a limited energy embargo during any U.S.-China war. Even then, they would only do so for a short period. They would not allow their own still heavily export-dependent economies to suffer great harm to keep the U.S. happy. Especially when considering the risk of how that might alienate a potentially war-winning China.
Indeed, the central underpinning of America’s alliances with the Sunni Arab monarchies is the shared understanding of an ultimately transactional relationship. In return for massive investments in the U.S. economy, the monarchies expect the U.S. to guarantee their security and their ability to sell oil on the global market. Any sustained closure of the strait would hurt these American allies very significantly.
Finally, there’s the lesson China has learned about Trump. The president is clearly uncomfortable with how this war is affecting international energy markets and American concerns over the price of gas and other living costs as the midterm elections approach. Trump’s standard fare leveraging of threats to escalate the war alongside offers of peace suggests he wants out as soon as possible. China will take this as a lesson on how to pressure Trump in any future crisis. A lesson to press American economic pressure points. Beijing will believe Trump lacks the stomach to commit to the long fight. Trump’s ability to favorably resolve the Strait of Hormuz battle will now be crucial in either confirming or dismantling these Chinese perceptions.
Is China suffering under this war?
Yes.
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Is China a net loser from this war?
At the strategic level, no.
