President Donald Trump on July 16 delivered a nationally televised, primetime address highlighting security gaps in U.S. voter registration databases and other election infrastructure. Figuring prominently in the president’s speech was newly declassified information on China’s acquisition of millions of U.S. voter registration records.
As reported in the Washington Examiner: “A cache of declassified intelligence documents released by the Trump administration Thursday night offered bold new details on China’s acquisition of U.S. voter information since 2016 … Trump said during his primetime address on Thursday that the People’s Republic of China acquired 220 million U.S. voter files containing names, addresses, phone numbers, political party preferences, and other sensitive information.”
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In reporting on this, many media outlets obscured the fact that, depending on the state, obtaining these data would have required illegitimate activity. NPR, for example, simply observed that “many states make their voter information publicly available.” CBS News, without naming any of the states identified in the declassified material, observed that: “voter data is accessible across all 50 states … Twenty states and Washington, D.C., will provide voter data with a simple public request, purchase or online download.”
However, the Washington Examiner report specifically identified 12 states (plus D.C.) as targets of China’s data acquisition, while also noting that additional states were targeted but have not been publicly identified. Per Ballotpedia, four of the listed states (Connecticut, Maryland, New York, and Oklahoma) restrict usage of their data, which would make China’s possession illicit.
Media reports also mostly downplayed the possibility that the data may be used for nefarious purposes. NPR emphasized the absence of any evidence that the data were used to influence an election or interfere with election processes or infrastructure. The CBS report emphasized that the acquired information “alone is not enough to alter or create voter registrations.”
In short, move on — nothing to see here. But is that sound advice?
As if on cue, the National Conference of State Legislatures this past week posted a summary of a session at the organization’s July 27-29 legislative summit on “scenarios to consider when safeguarding elections.” The session leader “laid out three scenarios, all of which have happened in one or more states,” one of which speaks directly to what a malevolent actor may do after acquiring voter registration data:
“Two weeks before a general election, a sophisticated voter suppression campaign uses commercial voter data and deploys an AI-generated micro-targeting messaging campaign. Specific segments of the voter population receive tailored disinformation. Spanish-speaking voters in two urban counties are warned that ICE will be present at polling locations. First-time voters receive false alerts that their registrations were not processed. Low-propensity rural voters get personalized robocalls claiming that their polling locations have been moved … the state’s publicly available voter file was used to build this suppression campaign.”
Thus, one plausible concern is potential use of the data for a voter disinformation campaign.
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Another is facilitation of mail ballot fraud. After obtaining voter registration data, malevolent actors might search for obsolete records (of voters who no longer reside in the state, for instance) and apply for mail or absentee ballots by impersonating these voters. In fact, states often lag in keeping their voter registration rolls current. Moreover, many states will supply a mail or absentee ballot to any registered voter who provides the last four digits of their Social Security number (which malevolent actors often can obtain on the dark web).
In sum, the acquisition of voter registration lists by foreign adversaries is truly concerning, and protecting election security should be a nonpartisan issue. Plausible, material risks to election security exist and should not be ignored.
Paul Calem is an independent consultant on banking regulation and household finance, with many years of research and experience in these areas from prior roles at the Bank Policy Institute and in the Federal Reserve System. He has a Ph.D. in economics from Brown University and a BA in mathematics from Duke University, with an extensive publication record.
