Is Kurdistan about to take its first step toward independence?

The following has been edited for length and clarity.

JPC: First off, please speak a bit about comparing and contrasting the relationship that the KRG of Iraq has had with the Obama administration and the Trump administration. Where are there policy similarities, differences, generally, what do you make of it?

BSAR: I would say we had a very good relationship with the Obama administration and we have a very good relationship with the Trump administration. That is our goal, to have a good relationship with the U.S. It’s not our business whether it’s a Democrat or a Republican administration, that’s for the people of the U.S. to decide. In terms of the actual policy, we so far haven’t seen much change in terms of the training, equipping, and support of the Peshmerga that continues and we’re pleased with that. In terms of the political and diplomatic engagement, that continues, and we’re very pleased with that.

JPC: Looking at recent events such as the fall of Mosul and the critical support that Peshmerga fighters provided in this, what are the ramifications of that going forward in a political nature, as we approach the upcoming (Kurdish independence) referendum?

BSAR: The positive things to say about Mosul are many.

On the military front, the cooperation between the Peshmerga and Iraqi security forces is truly unprecedented, and don’t forget [that] historically, it was the Iraqi military under Saddam Hussein that persecuted the Kurds and that was implementing the genocide against the Kurds. So for us to cooperate in a joint battle side by side against a common enemy is unique in our recent history, that’s for sure.

The fall of ISIS in Mosul is significant for all of Iraq, not just for the Muslawis, not just for Baghdad, but of course, for us too. Mosul is not that far from Erbil, our capital, and Mosul sits in the heart of Nineveh Province, and Nineveh is a mixed province: there are Kurds, there are Arabs, there are Assyrians, Turkoman, and in terms of faiths, there are Yezidis, Muslims, Christians, and others. So, the liberation of Mosul is important on many fronts.

How we take that forward to a political success is really crucial. So many lives have been lost, and the Iraqi Security Forces, the Peshmerga, have fought very bravely in very difficult circumstances. But how do we translate that into political success is really the key.

There needs to be a really clear governance structure for Mosul and for Nineveh, there needs to be a very clear outreach to the communities. The Sunnis who lived under ISIS, perhaps not through choice, they misunderstood, or did not leave in time, or didn’t understand what ISIS meant, there are many innocent people that lived under ISIS and suffered, but there are also those who collaborated and were fighters, terrorist fighters.

How do we differentiate between all of these groups and prevent reprisals, revenge, and retribution among all of these people? How do we go about creating a system of justice and accountability, so that those perpetrators of genocide and terrorism are held to account so that reconciliation can begin? These are all very big questions, and honestly, we in Iraq cannot solve them by ourselves. We need the U.S. to show leadership in this, we need the other coalition partners in this, and we need international organizations like the U.N., and others to be in the middle of this process to bring all of these sides together.

JPC: Secretary of Defense James Mattis recently met with his Turkish counterparts, reassuring them regarding the armament of Syrian Kurds, saying that these are loans and that weapons will be returned. With that in mind, what do you make of the fact that there is such a sensitive nature to the Turkish reaction when it comes to the potential of Kurdish independence and what this would do to Kurdish communities beyond the borders of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq?

BSAR: The referendum that we’re talking about and that will take place on Sept. 25 is only for Iraqi Kurdistan. We’re not talking about doing similar things across the borders. It is the democratic right of the people of Kurdistan to have a referendum to determine their future, a democratic right enjoyed by many people across the world, and we don’t see any reason why we should be denied that.

We have done our best to reassure all of the neighbors that this referendum is for Iraqi Kurdistan, that we have no plans to export the referendum. But also, we are determined to go ahead and that the people of Kurdistan need to be able to decide their destiny. Do we want to remain part of Iraq? Do we want to be independent? Or do we want something else?

At the end of the day, we who have lived in Iraq, let’s say, within Iraq, have a different history from the Kurds of Turkey, different than the Iranian Kurds, different than the Kurds in Syria. We are all linked by blood, we’re linked by culture, language, history, a history that is thousands of years old, while the division of these borders is only a hundred or a few hundred years old if you talk about the Ottoman and Persian empires.

So we Kurds are one. But at the same time, these borders that were created in the 20th century are also real and they’ve had an impact also on how the politics and the Kurdish movements have evolved and we have to deal with those realities.

JPC: With that in mind though, nevertheless, do you fear that in the event that independence is approved in this referendum, that there could be military reprisals from the likes of Iran or Turkey, especially if Kurds in these other countries see this new nation as allowing them to have a homeland? Would you even consider the possibility of there being a military reprisal from the Iraqi national government in Baghdad?

BSAR: Well first on the issue of Kurdish movements in those countries, those movements’ political parties and leaders have existed for a very long time. Iranian Kurdistan and in Turkey and Syria, we’re not introducing a new idea to them, that doesn’t already exist.

JPC: Sure, but this would introduce a legitimacy that the federal governments of those countries would likely find very troubling, no?

BSAR: Well, they may find it troubling, but it is our right. It is our democratic right to have a referendum and to determine our future.

When Iraq was carved out, nobody asked the Kurds what they want, and nobody consulted us or took our decisions and our aspirations into account. What I would like to say, you asked specifically about if there could be a violent response, I think we should look at the example of our relationship with Turkey. After the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003, Turkey was very concerned how this might affect Iraqi Kurdistan and was very unhappy that the constitution of Iraq, a new constitution recognized the Kurdish Region of Iraq and gave it a great deal of autonomy and authority.

And, for various reasons, by the time we reached 2007-08, Turkey was getting ready to invade Iraqi Kurdistan, there were troops massing on the border. Fast-forward a few years from there, we have then-Prime Minister Erdogan flying to Erbil, our regional capital, to open a Turkish Consulate and landing in an airport that was built by a Turkish company. We turned around our relationship with Turkey from one of hostility and suspicion to one of cooperation, and today, we even have a strategic energy agreement with Turkey.

I think that speaks to our ability to reassure our neighbors that what we say is what we mean and we mean what we say.

JPC: But to your own point about a previous relationship of hostility and suspicion, it could be said that is the relationship right now between the U.S. and Turkey. As Erdogan has become closer and closer to Vladimir Putin’s Russia, look at the recent missile defense deal that was signed between the two nations. Does that put any fear into your mind as to the potential of the relationship changing post-referendum regardless of the referendum result, but especially if it is for independence?

BSAR: As an outsider, I don’t really see any cooling of the relationship between Ankara and Washington. From the [Trump] administration officials that I talk to, and at a coalition conference held in Washington that I participated in, the relationship between and Ankara seems as strong as ever, so, I don’t see any weakening or chilling of that relationship.

JPC: When you speak with policymakers on Capitol Hill, senior individuals in the Trump administration, cabinet secretaries, how do you characterize their understanding of your goals post-independence as you paint that picture for them as a very real possibility? How are you gauging their reaction to what may soon be that reality? Also, how are you explaining that Kurdish values line up with American values? Also, what do you make of the term “radical Islamic extremism” given that the KRG is majority Sunni Muslim?

BSAR: We’re not afraid to call extremism, extremism [and] terrorism, terrorism. [When it comes to] Islamist terrorism, my brother and father were killed by Islamist terrorism, so let’s call a spade a spade. I don’t have a problem with that. We fight them, we have historically, and I’m very proud that the Peshmerga, male and female, are fighting Islamist extremist terrorists, we shouldn’t be afraid of that.

The people of Kurdistan by majority are Muslim, but we don’t believe in extremism, we don’t believe in terrorism, and we’ve been the victims of terrorism historically. With regards to what is the view of the [Trump] administration on the issue of the referendum and then of independence, there is the official statement that the State Department has issued and we understand that’s the view of [Defense Department], State, and the White House.

Of course, beyond that statement, we have conversations all the time about this. Their position is that this is not the right time to do this and this could destabilize an already fragile and unstable part of the world and so on.

Of course, our view is different. We don’t see the referendum as destabilizing. We think that there are many other issues that are of much greater concern, some of the PMUs – popular mobilization units – not all of them, are very disciplined, and some of them are not.

What is their role in the future of Iraq? What is their role now that Iraq is heading for elections next spring and as some analysts have put it, in the next elections there will be political parties standing for election in Iraq that now have an armed wing. So, these are all questions that we have.

We don’t see the referendum as a destabilizing factor at all, we believe it’s our democratic right and, already, Kurdistan has had elections. We had the referendum in 2005 on the Constitution of Iraq, and so on. Beyond the referendum, it will be on Sept. 25 and we have no plans of announcing independence on Sept. 26. We have stated this for a very long time.

Our plan is to talk to Baghdad. We have already invited them to engage in dialogue with us, to talk about the outcome of the referendum, next steps, and how to have a win-win result. When we’re talking about independence, we’re talking about an amicable divorce. We’re talking about being the best of neighbors. That’s our vision.

When we’re independent, Kurdistan and Iraq could be — we hope, will be — the best of allies, the best of neighbors, the best of friends. We have a shared history, we will have so many economic reasons to continue a good relationship.

JPC: Do you feel the U.S. has provided enough of a leadership role in the fight against ISIS?

BSAR: Definitely. Yes, it has. But it needs to continue. Without U.S. leadership in the fight, for example, I’m sure the Iraqis would agree, the Peshmerga forces, the Iraqi security forces, would not have cooperated in the liberation of Mosul, the U.S. had to be in the middle of that, otherwise, it would not have happened. The U.S. has led the coalition, has widened it. You do need U.S. leadership and we look forward to that leadership continuing.

JPC: Looking at U.S. domestic politics, there’s a great deal of division right now in the country between Republicans and Democrats. That said, when you speak with leadership on both sides of relevant committees on Capitol Hill such as Foreign Relations in the Senate and Foreign Affairs in the House, do you feel that there’s at least a mutual open-mindedness about the end-result of the referendum? Is a Kurdish referendum perhaps even good for U.S. domestic politics as a unifying moment?

BSAR: I would say that we are very mindful of and very appreciative of the bipartisan support that Kurdistan enjoys on the Hill. It’s a very precious situation – I don’t know if precious is the right word – and we need to never be complacent that we have this good will and support, we always have to earn it.

That is definitely the mission of this office. When we talk to members of Congress, we are as honest as we can be, as frank as we can be, we say thank you to America. We ask for what we need. We both hear and listen, we try not to make it a one-way dialogue. It’s a wonderful position to be in, to have this bipartisan support.

When it comes to the question of independence, there are members of Congress that have absolutely told us that it’s our right to have a referendum, and that does seem to cross the party lines. The same when it comes to independence, there are members of Congress that support the Peshmerga and admire Kurdistan for its religious freedom and the role of women in our society, but they’re worried about the break-up of Iraq, as they put it.

JPC: How are you feeling about the referendum?

BSAR: I am so excited! I mean, genuinely excited, honestly, I mean, I know my colleagues know that when our government announced that we have a date for the referendum, I could hardly contain myself.

It’s something I’ve dreamed of, and I’m looking at the picture of my mother and father when they were Peshmerga in the 1960s, they sacrificed so much. My extended family, my grandparents, my cousins, some of my cousins were born and grew up in jails, not because they committed a crime but because their parents were against Saddam.

For me, it feels historic. When I vote yes in the referendum, when I vote yes for independence, I’m casting a ballot for them [my family] and for so many others who have died along the way. Honestly, I think you’ll find that’s the case for the majority of people in Kurdistan who will be voting in this referendum. It’s something that every single person who will cast a ballot that day will be thinking of their ancestors or brother or sister who died fighting ISIS in the past year.

It’s not just emotional — as I said earlier, there are also many practical reasons on the policy front for why we want independence.

JPC: How do you summarize for Americans what September 25th will mean to you?

BSAR: [On the] Fourth of July I was in Philadelphia visiting a friend who lives there. He and his wife were showing us around all the various places where the Constitution was drafted, the Congress was there – it was my first time in Philadelphia – and it just felt so right that I should be spending the Fourth of July in 2017, when we will have our referendum, in Philadelphia.

I would say for Americans, Americans hold so many values dear that we do too: Democracy, freedom of speech, religious freedom, equality, these are all values that are very dear to us.

When I also look at the grievances that were written in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, grievances that the Americans hadd against the British, there are a lot of parallels. So, I would say that there are many, many parallels and I’d love to explore those even more.

J.P. Carroll (@JPCarrollDC1) is a freelance national security and foreign affairs reporter and commentator based in Washington, D.C. He is a contributor to Red Alert Politics (a sister publication of the Washington Examiner) and Providence Magazine.

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